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The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio, Texas

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San Antonio has been the center of the pecan-shelling industry for more than fifty years. G. A. Duerler, candy-maker and soft-drink concocter, pioneered the way in the closing years of the 19th century. Soon he was shelling more meats than he needed for his delicacies, and the excess was disposed of in national markets.¹

Initially the shelling process was performed by hand, but the introduction and development of machinery proceeded rapidly among all of the major operators. The mechanization of plants in St. Louis and in other cities progressed even during the Great Depression era. In San Antonio, however, the trend toward more modern production methods was reversed; for a vast army of migratory agricultural laborers and thousands of immigrants gravitated to San Antonio, the "capital of the Mexico that lies within the United States." They were unskilled, illiterate Mexican peasants, unaccustomed to urban life and to the American standard of living. They welcomed the opportunity for employment at any price.²

Quick to perceive a competitive advantage over their machine-minded rivals, San Antonio's entrepreneurs, under the leadership of the Southern Pecan Shelling Company, inverted the technological process. Machines were displaced by men. Thousands of Mexican peons were hired at amazingly low piece-work rates. Pecan shelling in the city became an exclusively hand operation. And the Southern Company, although it was not established until 1926, soon dominated the pecan industry, not only in San Antonio, but in the country at large. By the early 1930's it handled fully 50% of the total seedling pecan crop in the United States.³

¹ According to Alex Pomerantz, Vice-President, Southern Pecan Shelling Company, San Antonio, Texas.

² Cary McWilliams, "Mexicans to Michigan", *Common Ground*, Vol. 2, (Autumn, 1941), p. 5.

³ S. C. Menefee and O. C. Cassmore, *The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio*, WPA, Division of Research, 1940, p. xv.

⁴ *Ibid.*

See also: *Findings and Determination of the Presiding Officer*, Jan. 19, 1939; Release No. R-159, Wage and Hour Division, U. S. Dept. of Labor, pp. 3-4.

A corollary of the hand-shelling technique was the contracting system. Under this procedure Southern and other large concerns bought the nuts from farmers and dealers and transferred them to 'independent' contractors. The latter directly employed crackers and pickers to process the pecans, and reconveyed them to the companies. The contractors were to all intents and purposes employees of the big operators, who controlled the supply of nuts and set the prices for shelling, but the polite fiction was maintained that the contractors were private entrepreneurs—in business for themselves.⁶ Their true economic status was excellently illustrated when one of them was arrested and convicted in County Court for violation of the state child labor laws. The contractor had worked his eleven year old daughter in his factory because, as he told the Court, the child's earnings were needed for the support of the family.⁷

Primitive working and sanitary conditions prevailed in the contractors' plants. Frequently as many as 100 pickers toiled in a room 25 by 40 feet. Illumination was poor; ventilation was inadequate and the fine dust from the pecans hung in the air except when doors or windows were opened in warm weather. Inside flush toilets and even running water were a rarity until 1936 when a city health ordinance compelled all plants to install these luxuries.⁸ The statutes also required health examinations for all food handlers, but at least one case is on record of a known syphilitic who secured a job shelling pecans immediately after successfully passing the health department's physical examination.⁹

Shelling was often a family affair and no effort was expended to exclude children. They fingered the nuts as they worked or played about the premises. Sometimes the families took their work home, in spite of health department restrictions to the contrary, and all members of the household spent their leisure hours picking away in the discomfort of their own living quarters.¹⁰

Home-shelling was a doubly convenient procedure since the pecan industry was concentrated on the West Side of the city, an area of four square miles wherein fully two-thirds of the community's Mexican inhabitants resided. The section was and is one of the most extensive slum areas found anywhere in the United States.¹¹ The only vital substances that ever thrived in the area are the germs of tuberculosis and

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁷ *San Antonio Express*, March 25, 1938.

⁸ Meneffee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁹ "Disease and Politics in your Food: The Case of San Antonio," *Focus*, April, 1938, pp. 3-7.

¹⁰ *Women in Texas Industries*, Bulletin No. 126, 1936, Women's Bureau, U. S. Dept. of Labor, p. 79.

¹¹ Audrey Granneberg, "Maury Maverick's San Antonio," *Survey Graphic*, Vol. 28, No. 7 (July, 1939), p. 423. See also: Ralph Maitland, "San Antonio, the Shame of Texas," *Forum and Century*, Vol. 102, No. 2 (Aug. 1939), p. 53.

infant diarrhea. Thousands of human beings living in decrepit wooden shacks or in crowded corrals, breathlessly shelled pecans in a race with starvation. In these homes, which lacked toilets and running water and which rented for as little as fifty cents a week, pecans were shelled and picked for the fastidious tables of northern and eastern gourmets.

Pecan shelling is a highly seasonal industry. The nut crop matures in the fall. Peak employment is maintained through the winter and early spring months and skeleton crews function during the late spring and summer.

Fluctuations in the level of employment make it difficult to measure the size of the working force. The only reasonably accurate record is provided by the city health authorities who administered the requisite health examinations and issued permits to the pecan workers. At one time (1938) over 12,000 individuals employed in 110 different plants were registered. If the shellers without health cards are added to those legally working, their numbers would undoubtedly total 15,000 or more. Ten thousand of them were employed by the Southern Pecan Shelling Company.¹¹

Wages were unbelievably low. The owner of the Southern Company testified at a Regional Labor Board hearing in 1934 that his employees were paid three cents per pound for small pieces and five cents per pound for halves and that the usual worker could shell eight pounds in an eight hour day.¹² At that rate the average sheller earned less than \$2.00 per week.

Another report, this one by an NRA investigator, on the wages of 1,030 employees of 14 San Antonio contractors disclosed average earnings during December, 1934, of \$1.29 per week for 34.8 hours of work. Pickers and cleaners averaged three and five cents per hour, respectively. Some operators paid as little as two cents per pound in 1933-34. The rates went up the next year to five cents for pieces and six cents for halves but dropped to three and four cents the following season. From 1936 to 1938 the five and six cent scale generally prevailed.¹³

A former secretary of one of the pecan shellers' unions insists that wages plummeted to one cent per pound for pieces and one and one-half cents for halves at the depth of the depression. On that basis even the 'champions' could earn no more than \$1.50 per week; some of the less skilled received only sixteen cents for a week's labor.¹⁴ But whatever the exact amount, the weekly stipend was invariably enclosed in a yellow pay envelope appropriately inscribed with the bankers'

¹¹ Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹² *San Antonio Light*, May 13, 1934.

¹³ Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁴ Mrs. Lilia C. Caballero, former secretary of *El Nogal*, in conversation with the writer.

dictum: "Let a Bank Account shelter you on that Rainy Day! The Acorn from which wealth grows is—Saving!"¹⁸

It may be difficult for an outside observer to understand how the shellers and their families managed to survive, but it was no mystery to the president of the Southern Company. He explained to government officials that five cents per day was sufficient to support the Mexican pecan shellers because they ate a good many pecans while they worked.¹⁹ Since no limit was set on the amount they could eat, money incomes could be used for any additional wants that the shellers might wish to satisfy.

Another of the Company's officers spoke²⁰ in a different vein. He claimed that if the shellers made 75 cents by three o'clock, they would go home, for they did not care to make much money. They were satisfied to earn little, and besides, they had a nice warm place to work and could visit with their friends while they earned.

In 1938 two government analysts probed into the details of the shellers' lives in an effort to understand how they actually lived. Five hundred and twelve Mexican pecan workers and their families were interviewed. Four out of every ten of them had been working 'in pecans' for at least eight years. Median yearly income was \$251 for a family of 4.6 persons; only 2% of the families had incomes of \$900 or more. The mean weekly income reported by individuals in pecan work was \$2.73; for all jobs reported by the shellers' families, the mean income was \$3.01 for a 51-hour week. The average family studied had two wage earners with a total income of 69 cents per day.²¹

Seventy-seven percent of the pecan workers paid rental for their houses at an average rental of \$4.49 per month. Over 5% of the 'renters' paid no rent at all; they lived with relatives or in deserted or make-shift shacks. An additional 8% paid from one to two dollars rent per month.

Nine percent of the shellers had flush toilets; 39% had old-fashioned pit privies; evidently the others possessed no toilet facilities or shared communal privies with their neighbors. Only 25% illuminated their dwellings electrically; the rest used kerosene lamps.

Of the shellers interviewed 17% were born in San Antonio; 50% came to the city between 1911 and 1930. Hence most of them were long-standing residents of the community.

Out of the 512 pecan-shelling families, 450, or 88%, received some income from 'sources other than employment' during 1938. The aid

¹⁸*San Antonio: The Cradle of Texas Liberty and its Coffin*, Texas Civil Liberties Union, Austin, 1938, p. 14.

¹⁹*San Antonio Light*, May 13, 1934.

²⁰In conversation with the writer.

²¹Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. xvii. The data immediately following was taken from the same source.

came from the Guadalupe Church food depot, the CIO soup kitchen or from the agency distributing federal surplus commodities.

There were 867 children of school ages in the families studied. Only 55% attended the full school term and only 62% attended school at all in 1938. Among the shellers who worked also as migrant laborers, 22% of the children eleven to thirteen years of age did not attend school; in the nonmigratory group the corresponding figure was 11%.²⁹

As primitive as their existence was, however, most of the workers succeeded in surviving the darkest days of the 1930's. The Southern Pecan Shelling Company also managed to weather the depression. In a two year period its net realization exceeded \$500,000—not too disheartening a return for an enterprise with a very nominal capital outlay for plant and equipment.³⁰ During the same years workers who shelled the pecans for the Company continued to be a public charge. WPA relief, church aid and private charity bridged the gap between their slender earnings and starvation.³¹

At that time, when the national government through the NIRA was attempting to stabilize the pecan industry and to raise wages, two rival labor unions competed for the patronage of the shellers. One, *El Nogal*, a truly independent union, claimed a membership of nearly 4,000 between 1933 and 1936. It tried to extract dues of five cents a month from the members, but the secretary conceded that half of them did not pay.³² The other, the Pecan Shelling Workers' Union of San Antonio, was financially supported by the President of the Southern Company.³³ It was practically a one man affair conducted by Magdaleno Rodriguez, who was characterized by an NRA representative as a "fugitive from justice, a citizen of Mexico and a labor agitator who betrays his workers."³⁴

Rodriguez, purporting to represent 9,500 workers, joined the shelling companies in protesting against the establishment of an NRA code for the pecan industry. He insisted that the proposed minimum wage of 15 cents per hour would double labor costs in San Antonio's shelleries and put the operators out of business.³⁵ The code was never effective. Northern and southern operators disagreed on the proposed level of wages

²⁹ The late Harold Laski, spokesman for the British Labor Party, took note of the living conditions of the pecan shellers of San Antonio. In describing and lamenting the lack of any serious socialist movement in the United States, he insists that the deficiency "is not because an American proletariat is lacking." He cites among others "the pecan workers of San Antonio . . . (who) . . . have all the characteristics of a proletariat." See: *Reflections on the Revolution of our Time*, (New York: Viking Press, 1943), p. 150.

³⁰ Findings and Determination of the Presiding Officer, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² In conversation with the writer.

³³ Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁴ *San Antonio Light*, Dec. 7, 1934.

³⁵ *San Antonio Light*, Nov. 16, 1934.

and also on the question of a North-South wage differential. Thus the status quo was maintained in the city's most infamous industry.

After the abortive attempt under the NRA to boost the earnings of the pecan shellers, little or no attention was directed to their lowly state by government representatives. Piece rates ranged from three to eight cents per pound and the living conditions of the shellers varied from miserable to increasingly miserable.

Both 'independent' unions were singularly ineffective; a docile labor force became still more passive. But apparently their docility was only a surface manifestation, for on Feb. 1, 1938, at the peak of the season, thousands of shellers left their work tables in protest over a one cent per pound reduction in rates.

San Antonio has never witnessed an industrial dispute of like magnitude. Fully half of all of the pecan workers, scattered among 130 plants in the western portion of the city, 'hit the pavement'.²⁸ (unpaved dirt roads would be more accurate in this case). More than 1,000 pickets were arrested during the course of the strike on charges ranging from 'blocking the sidewalks' to 'disturbing the peace' and 'congregating in unlawful assemblies.' Within the first two weeks tear gas was used at least a half-dozen times to disperse the throngs that milled about the shelleries.²⁹

From the outset the city officials, Mayor Quin, Police Commissioner Wright and Chief of Police Kilday, fought the pickets with all weapons, legal and otherwise. An obscure city ordinance of doubtful constitutionality was invoked to prevent the pickets from carrying signs:³⁰

. . . it shall be unlawful for any person to carry . . . through any public street . . . any advertising sign, until said sign shall first have been submitted to the City Marshal, and a permit given for said carrying.

A 'City Marshal' had to approve of all signs carried by pickets—but there was no 'City Marshal' in San Antonio at that time. The office had been eliminated many years before.

The illegal sign, *prima facie* evidence of intent to picket in violation of police orders, read:³¹

This Shop
UNFAIR
Pecan Workers
Local No. 172
C. I. O.

²⁸ *San Antonio Express*, March 8, 1938.

²⁹ Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 17

³⁰ Cited in *Manuel Martinez et al vs. Owen W. Kilday* (1938), files of the District Court, San Antonio, Texas.

³¹ *San Antonio Express*, Feb. 13, 1938.

This was the crime for which strikers were arrested in wholesale lots and fined \$10 and costs—for carrying advertising signs without a city permit.⁸⁰

The Bexar County sheriff tendered a less unique interpretation of the law. He held that picketing was legal and announced that strikers would be unmolested as long as they created no disturbance. Thus peaceful picketing of the few shelling plants outside of the city limits continued.⁸¹

Police Chief Owen Kilday's interference with the strike was not confined to the pickets themselves. When J. Austin Beasley, a CIO organizer arrived in San Antonio to take over the leadership of the strike, he was promptly jailed by Kilday's minions. The Chief asserted that Beasley was wanted by postal authorities in El Paso, though the San Antonio postmaster and FBI office denied requesting Beasley's arrest. He was released the next morning when Kilday concluded that the postal officials did not want Beasley after all. Harassment by the police continued, nonetheless.⁸²

Throughout the 37-day dispute Chief Kilday insisted that no strike existed. When Donald Henderson of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers Union (Ucapawa) arrived in San Antonio, the Chief stated: "He is an intruder down here that hasn't 600 or 700 followers in the pecan industry. You call it a strike; I call it a disturbance out of Washington, D. C."⁸³ Actually, when Henderson came to the city, he took the strike leadership away from fiery Emma Tenayuca, San Antonio's most renowned Communist, and turned it over to Beasley, whose political sympathies were unknown in San Antonio.⁸⁴

Ucapawa had entered the fray after the presumably spontaneous walk-out by the remnants of the 'independent' unions. Lacking trained leaders they welcomed turning over the conduct of the strike to the CIO. By the middle of February the CIO union stated that more than 6,000 of the 12,000 shellers had applied for membership in the union and that about 3,000 paid dues during the strike period.⁸⁵

But Chief Kilday was adamant. He continued his strike suppression activities to prevent, as he put it, a "communistic revolution" among the pecan shellers. "I branded the leadership as communistic and I still think so."⁸⁶ When a union attorney queried Kilday as to his authority to judge the leadership, the Chief pontifically exclaimed: "It is my duty to interfere with revolution, and communism is revolution."⁸⁷

⁸⁰ *San Antonio Light*, March 2, 1938.

⁸¹ *San Antonio Evening News*, Feb. 12, 1938.

⁸² *San Antonio Evening News*, Feb. 22, 1938.

⁸³ Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁸⁴ According to Harry Koger, former regional organizer of the union.

⁸⁵ Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁸⁶ *San Antonio Express*, Feb. 26, 1938.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

Dr. Edwin Elliott, regional director of the National Labor Relations Board, also interposed objection to police actions. Again Kilday argued that "if the strike was won under its present leadership, 25,000 workers on the West Side would fall into the Communist Party."³⁸ Dr. Elliott suggested that it was not Kilday's function to keep 25,000 people out of the Communist Party, but the Chief averred that he would make it his function.

The crusade proceeded. Based on his definition: "A Communist is a person who believes in living in a community on the government and tearing down all religion,"³⁹ Kilday packed 'his' jail in a manner remindful of the 'Black Hole of Calcutta.' At one time almost 250 men were confined in a jail section with a normal capacity of 60 persons.⁴⁰

Five prominent women of the community inspected the Kilday domain in an effort to determine precisely the conditions under which the pecan shellers were held. It was discovered that the shellers were not allowed the privilege of using the runway between the cells as were burglars, drunks and pickpockets. Eight to 18 men were kept night and day in cells built to accommodate four persons. Female prisoners were packed in like fashion. As many as 33 women were confined to a cell designed for six people. Prostitutes and pecan shellers resided in the same cell. And although 90% of the prostitutes suffered from infectious venereal diseases, all cellmates shared a common toilet and the lone drinking cup.⁴¹

The inquisitorial methods of the police department were greeted with general approbation by the 'respectable' element of San Antonio. The Mexican Chamber of Commerce, the Lulac (League of United Latin-American Citizens), and Archbishop Drossaerts refused to support the strike under Henderson's leadership.⁴² The Archbishop commended the police for their actions against 'communistic influences,' but somewhat paradoxically he also called upon employers to raise wages, because he said, low wages breed communism.⁴³ At a lower level in the hierarchy Reverend John Lopez had a different solution for the problems of the pecan shellers. He urged them to return to the principles of the church, for the church was a friend of the working masses.⁴⁴ Not to be outdone, the members of the San Antonio Ministers' Association, in their demand for a prompt settlement of the strike, insisted that "all

³⁸ *San Antonio Evening News*, Feb. 17, 1938.

³⁹ *San Antonio Express*, Feb. 15, 1938.

⁴⁰ *San Antonio Express*, Feb. 26, 1938.

⁴¹ *San Antonio: The Cradle of Texas Liberty*, p. 9.

⁴² *San Antonio Express*, Feb. 14, 1938.

⁴³ *San Antonio Express*, Feb. 27, 1938.

⁴⁴ *San Antonio Evening News*, Feb. 28, 1938.

Communitistic, Fascist or any un-American elements not be parties of the settlement."⁴⁸ They neglected to define their terms, however.

The newspapers also joined the chorus. The *San Antonio Express* editorialized:⁴⁹

"To all appearances, outside influences were mainly responsible for the strike. Paid agents from the Committee for Industrial Organization, and Communist agitators before them, convinced the pecan shellers that they were being treated unfairly . . .

Chief of Police Kilday—knowing the CIO—did well to take firm action to prevent serious disorders.

No one will begrudge the pecan shellers a better living wage, if that be possible without destroying the industry."

Government investigators were less sympathetic with Kilday's machinations. The State Industrial Commission, ordered by Governor Allred to conduct public hearings in San Antonio, reported unanimously that police interference with peaceful assembly and picketing was without justification.⁵⁰ Dr. Elliott, NLRB observer at the hearings, concluded that "there has been a misuse of police authority in handling the strike."⁵¹ The Governor himself took exception to some of the acts charged against the police of San Antonio: refusing to permit strikers to congregate peacefully on vacant lots hired by them for that purpose; grabbing union buttons from the strikers and trampling them underfoot; and forcing people to become 'scabs' under threat of deportation.⁵²

But the forces of 'law and order' prevailed. Even the soup kitchens set up to provide free food for the strikers were ordered closed because they allegedly violated the city health ordinances.⁵³

The shellers finally sought to put 'the law' to work for themselves; they prayed for a temporary restraining injunction to enjoin police interference with peaceful picketing. The plea was rejected by Judge S. G. Tayloe of the 45th District Court, who rendered his decision in a six-page opinion—immediately upon the termination of oral arguments! The magistrate explained to open-mouthed attorneys that he had awakened at four o'clock that morning to "write his views", with the mental reservation that the oral arguments might change his mind.⁵⁴

⁴⁸*San Antonio Express*, Feb. 13, 1938.

⁴⁹*San Antonio Express*, March 11, 1938

⁵⁰*Dallas Morning News*, Feb. 18, 1938.

⁵¹*San Antonio Light*, Feb. 16, 1938.

⁵²*Houston Chronicle*, March 5, 1938.

⁵³*San Antonio Evening News*, Feb. 12, 1938.

⁵⁴*San Antonio Express*, Feb. 27, 1938.

They didn't. The judge's early morning stint was preserved for posterity if not for precedent.

The Tayloe opinion is a classic example of the legal mind at work and a faithful reproduction of the mind-set of San Antonio's 'better element.' The judge reviewed the evidence and agreed that "the average wage of these workers is so small as only to provoke pity and compassion."¹⁰⁸ Tayloe continued—his sympathies no longer in doubt:

The evidence shows that probably many hundreds of persons have been engaged in the strike and have on various occasions been arrested and the evidence for the plaintiffs shows that on three or four occasions excessive force was used by the arresting officers resulting in painful injuries to such persons. However, none have been sent to a hospital for treatment.

The Judge conceded that:

There can be no doubt about the right of the strikers to cease work and also to attempt peaceably to persuade other workers to cease their work and to also attempt to dissuade other persons from entering into the employ of their former employers.

With the undoubted right of the strikers to peacefully picket firmly established, the justice proceeded to explain to the pecan shellers why they did not possess this right after all.

The assembling in one place of a large number of pickets incensed by a spirit of resentment to grievances, whether real or imaginary, tends to produce disorder and become a menace to the public peace, as well as an interference with orderly traffic and use of the streets by others, and I cannot think that the Legislature has transcended its rightful powers or violated any natural, constitutional or other lawful rights in enacting or authorizing the enactment of such preventative measures.

In effect, then, the judge said that although there was no doubt about the right of the shellers to picket, there was also no doubt about their not having that right. And anyway, His Honor concluded, granting of the injunction would cause too great a strain on the minds of the police officers:

To grant an injunction of the nature sought would put every city peace officer in peril of contempt proceeding for violation of the injunction and would require such officer to so determine difficult and doubtful questions as to his authority in many cases.

Apparently it was far better, in all cases where the officer was undecided, to send the suspect to jail and ask questions later.

A dramatic sidelight to the case developed the night before judgment was pronounced. A 'bomb' was found in the basement of the County Court House—directly below the room in which the case was being tried. Military experts insisted that the lethal object was a home-made

¹⁰⁸Manuel Martinez et al v. Owen W. Kilday, et al (1938) files of the District Court, San Antonio, Texas.

incendiary. Newspaper headlines screamed that the 'bomb' was potent and explosive. The 'bomb' was 'exploded' and proved to be a 'dud' several days later—after the judge rendered his decision—when a Court House clerk, who worked in a vault in the basement, asserted that he had seen the object every day for nearly two years. It was being used as a weight to swing a basement door shut.⁸⁸

Two more weeks of unrest followed the court decision. Finally on March 9th, after 37 days of strife, the opposing forces consented to submit their cases to a board of arbitration. Local Union No. 172 of Ucapawa was recognized as agent for all employees in the industry for purposes of arbitration. The board, composed of Jack Horkheimer, owner of the Alamo Pecan Company, the Reverend Marcus Hogue of Austin, representing the union, and Mayor Tom Miller of Austin, neutral member, rendered its decision on April 13th.

In the words of the press: "The settlement was a compromise, leaning in favor of the operators."⁸⁹ The wage scale of five cents per pound for pieces and six cents for halves, which was instituted immediately prior to the strike and which precipitated the walkout, was to be continued through May 31st. During the slack season, June 1st to November 1st, an increase of one-half cent per pound was ordered. The employers in turn agreed to recognize Local No. 172 as sole bargaining agent in any plant upon proof that it represented a majority of the employees in that plant.⁹⁰ The latter, incidentally, was nothing more than the employers' legal obligation under terms of the National Labor Relations Act.

Contracts were duly consummated with all major operators. When the contracts expired, new agreements were negotiated with 13 operators who normally employed some 8,000 workers; even Southern Pecan Company fell into line. The new contracts, signed in the fall of 1938, provided for a closed shop, a check-off system, grievance machinery and piece rates of seven and eight cents per pound. The wage scale was to apply only if the industry could obtain an exemption from the minimum wage rates set by the Fair Labor Standards Act which had recently been passed by the federal Congress. Otherwise, of course, the statutory minimum of 25 cents per hour would prevail.

The union joined the Southern Pecan Shelling Company and the other operators in maintaining that pecan shelling involved the process-

⁸⁸*San Antonio Light*, Feb. 28, 1938.

⁸⁹*San Antonio Express*, April 14, 1938.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

The *Monthly Labor Review* labeled the settlement "an increase of one-half cent per pound." However, with the 'increase' the scale was still one-half cent below that effective prior to Jan. 31, 1938. See: "Working Conditions of Pecan Shellers in San Antonio" Vol. 48, No. 3 (March, 1939), p. 550.

ing of an agricultural product; that San Antonio and all of Texas were within the area of production for pecans; hence exempt from the provisions of the minimum wage law.⁸²

When its plea was rejected, the Southern Company petitioned for a learning period of three months during which time 2,500 to 3,000 workers were to be trained to operate its newly installed machine-shelling equipment. In lieu of the statutory 25 cents per hour the Company offered to pay 15 cents per hour to the learners while they absorbed the intricacies of machine production. Southern claimed that the learning period was necessary because "there is no labor available, trained, skilled or experienced for machine operations. The entire processing operation must be learned."⁸³ The request was not selfish but represented an effort to absorb the displaced workers. "The application is made to prevent the curtailment of employment opportunities,"⁸⁴ said the Company.

The Wage and Hour Division of the U. S. Department of Labor conducted public hearings in San Antonio before acting on the Company's application. Except for one other employer, representatives of the industry were unanimously opposed to the 'learning period.' E. M. Funston of St. Louis, Southern's largest competitor, testified that a beginner did not require more than a week to become an efficient sheller or picker. A Chicago operator, representing an association of 21 houses, agreed. A Texas sheller insisted that he could break in and develop a new worker in two days, while an agent of the manufacturer who installed the machines at the Southern Company argued that an experienced hand-picker would reach average proficiency the same day that he commenced work with the new machines.⁸⁵

Everett Looney of the Texas Industrial Commission and Mayor Tom Miller of Austin, both of whom had previous contact with the shelling industry in San Antonio, urged favorable consideration of the application. They believed that a training period for shellers was essential. The union's business agent concurred, although several pecan workers trained in the old hand-picking process testified that they thought they could become proficient at the new processes in from two to ten days' time.⁸⁶

The Wage and Hour Division employed an experienced management consultant and expert in manufacturing processes to examine the new mechanized operations. He noted that when a plant is mechanized, the

⁸²Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁸³Findings and Determination, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 14.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 17-20.

cracking and shaking operations loosen a proportion of the meats and remove and draw off a portion of the shells, depositing pieces and halves in separate receptacles. The meats so freed involve no picking labor costs. The expert also stated that careful attention to the economies of operation is heightened when wages are raised and that improved lighting would add to efficiency and productivity of workers. These, however, were management problems and a reflection of its efficiency. Furthermore, it would be easier to obtain efficient pickers, for the adoption of machines reduces the number of workers needed and leaves a wider choice in the selection of personnel.⁴¹

The hearing officer concluded that the Southern Company's request should be denied. He decided that since there were between 7,000 and 10,000 experienced pickers in San Antonio, it would not be too difficult for the Company to recruit the 2,500 or 3,000 workers needed for machine operations. The evidence was conclusive that not more than one week was required to train a beginner. What Southern lacked was not experienced workers but rather the technical management personnel to supervise the operation of the new equipment. It was for the training of these officials that the 90-day training period was desired. If the training period were granted, "the worker would pay in sub-standard wages for a part of the cost of training management and mechanizing the factory. It would make pecan pickers take a pay cut to compensate management while it is putting itself through a learner period."⁴²

Several other firms sought exemption from the provisions of the Wage and Hour law. One operator from Weatherford, Texas, claimed that he sold pecans in the shell to townspeople and farmers and later bought back the picked meats. He denied violating either the spirit or the letter of the law, since he sold the pecans and bought the meats back again "at the market price." Thus the home-workers earned a profit, not a wage.⁴³

Another employer claimed exemption from the law on the grounds that he rented seats in his plant to the workers. He sold them pecans in the morning and bought back the shelled nuts in the afternoon.⁴⁴

A third employer took a different approach.⁴⁵

"The Mexicans don't want much money . . . Compared to those shanties they live in, the pecan shelleries are fine. They are glad to have

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴³Menefee and Cassmore, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

a warm place to sit in the winter. They can be warm while they're shelling pecans, they can talk to their friends while they're working, their kids come in after school and play because it's better than going home. If they get hungry they can eat pecans.

If they put the 25 cent minimum wage law over on us, all these Mexicans will be replaced by white girls. The Mexicans have no business here anyway. They flock into San Antonio with their kind, and they cause labor troubles or go on relief at the expense of the taxpayer."⁶⁶

Despite their contentions the larger operators at least were forced to pay their workers the legal minimum wage. By March of 1939 the Southern Pecan Shelling Company employed 1,800 shellers at the 25-cent minimum. Three months later the number of employees covered by the statutory minimum dropped to 800 and a like number labored in smaller plants which were evading the law.⁶⁷

Employment in the industry continued to decline. By 1941 Southern's labor force fell to 600 members. In 1950 the Southern Company, which at one time had employed 10,000 workers at the peak of the season, hired only 350 production employees during its busiest periods. Total output was somewhat less than it had been in 1938, but Southern was still one of the largest operators in the United States.⁶⁸

The effect of the minimum wage law on the pecan industry in San Antonio is readily apparent. The earnings of those who continued in employment doubled and in some cases tripled. However, approximately 5,000 of the less skillful shellers lost their jobs almost immediately and 5,000 more were let out within the next few years. They were either replaced by machines, as described above, or they left the industry along with the 'straggler enterprises' which were forced out of existence by the increase in production costs.⁶⁹ Two labor economists observed in this regard that in the entire United States the only major group of workers displaced as a direct result of the minimum wage law was in the pecan-shelling industry.⁷⁰

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁶⁷According to the vice-president of the Company, in conversation with the writer.

⁶⁸Frederic Meyers, *Economics of Labor Relations*, (Chicago: Irwin, 1951), p. 409.

⁶⁹Lloyd Reynolds, *Labor Economics and Labor Relations*, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949), p. 459; and Meyers, *op. cit.*

The raising of the legal minimum wage to 75 cents per hour in 1950 had little effect on employment in the pecan industry in San Antonio. The new law represented a 50% increase for the employees, who were earning 50-cents per hour immediately prior to its enactment. The secretary-treasurer of the Southern Company informed the writer that employment did not perceptibly decrease when the legal minimum was increased.

Percentage-wise, the jump from 50 cents to 75 cents was not nearly so significant as the increase from 8 cents to 25 cents in 1938.

Thus, regardless of humanitarian or other justification for the statutory setting of minimum employment standards, thousands of individuals in San Antonio became 'unemployable' as a result. It was a boon to the younger, more vigorous and productive of the pecan workers. One wage earner in a family could earn as much as two or three had done before. But the old and the feeble, most of whom were unable to speak English and many of whom were excluded from public assistance because of their alien citizenship, were removed from the employed labor force. Few employers found them 'productive' enough to warrant paying them the legal minimum wage.

A small segment of these 'displaced persons' was absorbed by the Finck Cigar Company, which ostensibly confines its activities to the State of Texas, hence is not 'covered' by the federal law. Finck never lacks a labor supply. Even during periods of high levels of employment, several thousand persons, otherwise 'unemployable', compete for the few hundred jobs available at 25 cents per hour.⁷⁰

Not only has employment in the pecan industry, at one time the most important employer of San Antonio labor, declined to a point of relative insignificance, but the industry's companion of ten years' standing—the union—has completely vanished. The Pecan Workers' Branch of Local Union 172, which was conceived during the 1938 dispute, disappeared from the scene in 1948.⁷¹ It passed without fanfare and with little public mourning. In fact so quietly did death come that many union leaders in San Antonio were unaware of the funeral.

Even while it lived, however, the union led a rather uneventful existence after its initial fight for recognition. In the early 1940's the union minimum wage was the statutory minimum of 40 cents per hour. Contractual relations were maintained with the major operators; all followed the actions of the acknowledged leader, the Southern Company. Minor gains were achieved and harmony reigned in the industry.

Illusions of prosperity were soon shattered by a combination of events that destroyed the pecan shellers' union in the city. The first blows were delivered over a three year period but the impact was not felt until the end of that period. The Food, Tobacco and Agricultural Workers International (CIO), successors to Ucapawa, had headquartered its regional director in San Antonio. Located there, he could keep a watchful eye on the pecan local. When the regional office was moved to another city, however, close supervision of the activities in San Antonio was no longer exercised. Leadership of the local gravitated into the hands of two English-speaking Mexican girls, wise to the ways of the business world. Their first devious act was to discontinue the regular business

⁷⁰The Pioneer Flour Mill Branch of Local 172 is still active and apparently thriving. Almost all production workers at the Pioneer Mill are union members.

meetings of the union. Then, since the 'check-off' was in effect, their sole duties consisted of calling for the union dues at the companies' offices. A membership of 600 to 800 was maintained and dues approximating \$700 were collected monthly. But the International was informed that merely 25 or 30 members were active and per capita taxes were paid for that number only. In lieu of the balance of the funds due the international, a doleful tale of declining membership was remitted to central headquarters. Literally thousands of dollars were pocketed by the local president and secretary of the union. When the fraud was discovered, the officers left for parts unknown and the local union was left with an empty treasury.²¹

The union was not ready to succumb, however. Regional director Harry Koger was returned to San Antonio to help repair the damage to the union and to its treasury. At that point a second warning knell was sounded. H. B. Zachry, a construction contractor with twenty years' experience in resisting the demands of the building trades unions, purchased the Southern Pecan Shelling Company.

Zachry had never signed a union contract and vowed that he never would. Though many of his fellow-contractors operated union shops and 90% of the commercial construction in San Antonio was union work, Zachry remained outside of the fold. Pecan union leaders were understandably disturbed. The largest plant in town had a change of ownership, and the new proprietor, as he informed this writer, was "inherently opposed to union contracts."

When the existing contract with the pecan union ran out in 1946, the unexpected happened. Not only did Zachry agree to continue contractual relations, but he also conceded a five cent per hour raise to Koger, the union negotiator. Koger was jubilant, since this was the first union contract that Zachry had ever signed.²² It was also his last. The following year Zachry refused to renew the agreement. The union was in no position to protest. A strike threat was an empty weapon. A loosely knit organization whose members were not accustomed to attending union meetings and were not indoctrinated with union principles could not survive in a hostile atmosphere. Since the issue was not one of wages, the pecan shellers were content to let the union expire. And when it expired, so also did the anomalous epoch of pecan shelling in San Antonio.

²¹According to a former official of the union.

²²Conversations with Koger and Zachry.

Some Economic Aspects of Marxian Theory and Soviet Practice

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Introduction

The title of this paper may be a trifle misleading. While the writer is interested in, and will compare certain Soviet institutions and practices with the classic body of Marxist thought, he is also interested in pointing out, where possible, certain features of Marxian theory which give no answers or, at best, imperfect approximations to actual Soviet problems and to observe how the Russians have responded to these situations. This is especially significant in relation to certain economic and social problems besetting the Russians today. The writer has also attempted to use other theories and tools outside the Marxian arsenal in order more properly to fit Soviet experience into a frame of reference which would make its operations more intelligible, as well as to provide clues for its deviations from Marxian theory. This in no way implies that the writer favors a theoretical yardstick vis à vis the actual operations of any set of economic institutions. It is simply that a theoretical framework has been considered useful in helping to illuminate and integrate many of the seemingly disparate elements contained in a mere description of any economy.

Some Economic Problems of Soviet Society¹

Any industrial economic system has to find ways and means for making four groups of decisions. First, it is necessary to decide what to produce and this implies as its corollary that there be a locus of decision-making for this purpose. Secondly, decisions have to be made concerning the most efficient allocation of resources, the most effective way to combine the factors of production so as to produce in optimum proportions the various types and quantities of products needed in a modern industrial society. This applies not only to present but to future goods. Thirdly, there must be some sort of division of income or product among the various individuals and groups composing society resulting from their participation in the productive effort. Finally, there have to be devices for ensuring the orderly distribution of the products of the economy among the population.²

¹The writer is indebted to Professor Abram Bergson, of Columbia University, for discussing and illuminating during the course of his classroom lectures most of the economic problems of Soviet society discussed in this article.

²Frank H. Knight, *Social Economic Organization*, (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 130-137.

The answer given to these problems by classical and neo-classical economics and, to a lesser extent, by the actual operations of a market economy, is well known. The free play of the acquisitive impulses of the individual in a competitive society would result in a maximum flow of goods and services. The continuous search for maximum profits by the entrepreneur would supposedly lead him to produce those goods having the greatest social value for consumers. The pressure of competition would result in his manufacturing these goods with a minimum input of labor and resources per unit of output. Competition would also force the producer to sell his goods at a price just equal to his cost of production, including a "normal" return for his managerial skills. The owners of the factors of production, including labor, would sell their services and goods so as to derive maximum payment for their skills and efforts. Consumers would allocate their earnings in such a manner as to derive the greatest possible satisfaction from the goods and services purchased. Given the resources and state of the industrial arts currently available, the end result would be one in which social values would be equal to social costs with the maximum output of goods and services.

This system has been under attack since its formulation. In terms of institutional consequences, Marx and his followers argued that this very same system would result in a "polarization of classes" among those owning the means of production and those forced to work for them so that the end result would be maldistribution of income, crises and mass unemployment culminating in a violent overthrow of the existing social order. Marx also anticipated the viewpoint of modern anthropology by denying that the "laws" of economics were universal categories, applicable at all times and places. His cultural relativism laid stress upon the fact that each type of social organization displays economic or social relationships which follow laws of its own. His refusal to lay down what he considered a utopian blueprint for the future economic organization of socialist society was founded on this view. Nevertheless, there are some scattered references in Marx's voluminous works which are interesting in the light of current Soviet practices.

Paul M. Sweezy, one of the foremost spokesmen for Marxian economics in the United States today, at one time stated that "Marxian economics is essentially the economics of capitalism while 'capitalist' economics is in a very real sense the economics of socialism."³ The full significance of this statement will be observed presently.

The Marxian labor theory of value is a theory in the tradition of macro-economics.⁴ It attempts to explain the formation and determina-

³Paul M. Sweezy, "Economics and the Crisis of Capitalism," *The Economic Forum*, III (Spring, 1935), 79. The writer has recently received a letter from Dr. Sweezy in which he states that he has long ago ceased to believe that capitalist economics can be of much use to a socialist society.

tion of total social values and the distribution of these values among the various groups composing capitalist society, chiefly the capitalist and proletarian classes. It is the writer's opinion that Boehm-Bawerk and all those who have criticized the labor theory of value on the grounds of individual price formation have been tilting their lances at imaginary windmills.⁶ Boehm-Bawerk, for example, felt that he had disposed of the Marxian system by pointing out the apparent contradictions regarding this matter of value determination in Volumes I and III of "*Das Kapital*," this despite the obvious fact that Marx himself had called attention to it in the same work.⁷

By employing the labor theory of value, Marx was able to lay the groundwork for its corollary, surplus value, and his theory of exploitation. For if labor alone produces all value, then any appropriation by other groups of the fruits of that labor represents ill-gotten gains and "exploitation" of the workers. Since profits, interest and rent are merely component parts of surplus value, these distributive shares represent unearned increments accruing to these respective groups by reason of certain institutional arrangements under capitalism.

The writer does not have time to dwell more fully on the problem of the Marxian labor theory of value in a paper of this kind. Suffice it to say that most of the learned disputations concerning it for well nigh this past century have been exceedingly sterile. Both antagonists and proagonists have argued in different and shifting frames of reference. It seems to the writer that there are three separate, yet interconnected, strands of thought making up the labor theory of value. One is philosophic in nature and its origin goes back well beyond Locke and the classicists. It asserts that labor is the only source of value. On this philosophic foundation, Marx proceeds to erect its ethical corollary, to wit, since labor "produces" all value, the proceeds of that labor should belong to the laborer alone. Any other shares represent "exploitation" of the workers. Finally, the labor theory of value can be tested pragmatically, that is, as a theory of individual price. Boehm-Bawerk concentrated on this latter aspect of the theory. One can here immediately observe a divergence of actual prices in the market from labor costs. The intermingling of these three strands of thought by the respective disputants has only served to completely obscure the real problem posed by the theory.

It appears that even Marx and Engels were misled in this matter, otherwise they could never have made the assertion that the labor theory of value would still apply under socialism.⁷ Yet they felt that their theory

⁶Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, (Chicago: C. H. Kerr & Co., 1909).

⁷E. Boehm von Bawerk, *Karl Marx and the Close of His System*, (London: T. F. Unwin, 1898).

⁸Marx, *op. cit.*, I, 335-336.

offered an adequate explanation to the problem of rational allocation of resources in a collectivist society. This, in turn, implied that the theory could be used in the determination of individual prices, and that since costs were proportional to labor-time expended one had only to compare relative costs to relative utilities in order to ascertain the allocation of scarce resources.

It remained for Ludwig von Mises to point out the impossibility of such a scheme under a collectivist society.⁸ Under socialism, there would be abolition of private ownership of the means of production namely, capital goods, and scarce natural resources. Planning would replace the market place as the procedure by which capital goods and natural resources would be allocated among different uses. Prices in the consumers' goods market would be one basis for rational allocation since they would respond to consumers' needs. But there would be no basis under socialism for the measurement of the costs of capital goods and natural resources, the other factor needed for rational allocation. The planners would have to use arbitrary calculations, including an arbitrary rate of interest. The result would be a waste of economic resources.

Von Mises assumed a free market was necessary for the rational allocation of resources. The problems which he raised for socialists have long been answered, at least theoretically by Oscar Lange and others.⁹ But they were answered only by using the classical or orthodox tools of analysis. Hence Sweezy's statement. Von Mises' criticism of the Marxian labor theory as a theory of resource allocation is still quite valid. The significance of these rather abstruse theoretical arguments in relation to Soviet planning and resource allocation will be seen shortly.

To return to the first of the problems raised at the beginning of this section, namely, who decides what to produce and where the locus of such decision-making is located, let us look at the Soviet answer to this problem. From the available evidence, it is reasonably certain that the major decisions on general production goals are now reached by the Politburo and embodied in the various Five Year Plans.¹⁰ This concentration of the decision-making power on matters of national import in the economic field parallels the political concentration of power.

⁸F. Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, (New York: International Publishers, 1935), pp. 345-346.

⁹Ludwig von Mises, "Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialischen Gemeinwesen," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften*, XLVII, 1920. Translated and reprinted in Friedrich A. von Hayek (ed.) *Collectivist Economic Planning*, (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1938), pp. 87-131.

¹⁰Oscar Lange, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," *Review of Economic Studies*, IV (October, 1936 and February, 1937), pp. 53-71; 123-142. Fred M. Taylor, "The Guidance of Production in a Socialist State," *American Economic Review*, XIX, pp. 1-8.

¹¹Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 300-302.

Once the major economic decisions are made, the State Planning Commission, or Gosplan, is charged with the duty of drawing up a specific plan. Subdivisions of the provisional plan are worked out by territorial and functional units until it finally reaches the individual operating units, the state enterprises. As the plan filters its way down, it tends to become more and more detailed. When it reaches the lowest rung in the economic ladder, it begins its upward ascent once again bearing with it the suggestions of the lower bodies. This counterplanning feature is made much of in Soviet economic literature which stresses its democratic aspects. There is not the slightest evidence, however, that such suggestions in any way affect the fundamental aims of the Plan. They do not affect such basic decisions as to whether the economic resources of the country will be directed into heavy industry or light industry, into war goods or peace goods, consumers' goods or producers' goods which, after all, are the essential decisions of the Plan. They are merely additional stimuli to production that, together with the elaborate apparatus of control, help to take the place of the spurs and checks provided by the market in a capitalist economy.

Once the basic decision has been made as to what to produce, there remains a host of related decisions concerning the most efficient allocation of available resources; the most efficient combination of raw materials, factory equipment, and labor necessary to produce the desired goods.

Since it is impossible to plan and enforce every single detail of the Plan from the top, another test of the achievement of the Plan both in attaining output norms and in efficiently utilizing scarce resources lies in the *khozraschët* system, or system of economic calculation. This involves a pricing system in which the operations of the firm are recorded in money terms. Books and accounts are kept on the materials, fuels, labor, etc., which are used and since both costs and output are valued at fixed prices, profits and losses can be calculated. This is all the more necessary since inputs can be dictated from above, but outputs depend upon the efficiency of the plant. Even with regard to inputs, there is a limit to the specificity of the Plan. For example, while the Plan generally specifies four types of labor and the wages for each category, it cannot say how such types of labor should be combined in order to produce the maximum output. It cannot determine how many carpenters, blast furnace tenders, etc., to employ in order to attain the desired result. And the same reasoning applies to materials, fuels, etc.

Thus, within the limits of the directives from the top, the individual state enterprise has a certain amount of autonomy and within the enterprise, the role of the manager becomes most important in efficiently utilizing the factors of production so as to show a substantial profit margin. To give effect to the principle of economic calculation, the individual enterprise is divorced from the state budget and operates on

an independent financial basis. The khozraschët system thus provides the basis for the formulation of decisions on all levels in the use of resources, as well as providing a type of control of decision-making at the enterprise level.

The individual state enterprise is originally endowed with a certain amount of fixed and working capital for which no interest is paid. Additional capital to meet seasonal and other special purposes is borrowed from the banking system and the individual firm is expected to repay this loan from its own revenue, including interest charges. Depreciation on capital is reckoned as part of the firm's cost and is deposited with the banks. Part of it is then used for capital repairs and the rest is turned over to the higher agencies for investment purposes generally. Since all other costs, as well as selling prices, have been fixed by the State, the firm is now in a position to calculate its profit margin as against the "normal" profit margin estimated by the State Planning Commission. The actual profit margin then becomes a vital factor in assessing managerial success. Bonuses and premiums are the tangible rewards for such success.

Thus, the Russians have made use of the profit concept in a way entirely unforeseen by Marx who viewed profits merely as an unearned income accruing to the capitalist class. The functional significance of this economic category as a formulator of decision-making in the use of resources was completely overlooked by him.

According to classical economic theory, the resources needed for the construction of new plants and the replacement of wornout machinery came from the sacrifice of present consumption. To a considerable extent, they are derived in a capitalist economy from individual and corporate savings. Interest payments have been widely regarded as a form of reward for waiting or time preference, thus permitting the construction or replacement of capital equipment.

To some extent, individual savings are a source of plant construction and replacement in the Soviet Union. As early as 1926, Stalin himself spoke out in favor of interest payments as the normal way of "mobilizing" individual savings.¹¹ When the Soviets started their industrialization drive in the late twenties they could not, for a variety of reasons, afford to rely upon individual thrift alone as a source of real capital investment. Individual savings were entirely inadequate in the light of future investment decisions. The requirements of the day demanded that decisions concerning real capital investment be centralized. For these reasons, capital investment has been, and is, financed very heavily out of the national budget. During the period from 1938 to 1940, for example,

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 309.

capital investment constituted nearly one-fourth of the budgetary expenses.¹²

The chief source of budget revenue and hence, indirectly, of capital investment is the turnover tax. It constituted 61.1% of government revenues between 1938 and 1940.¹³ A second and far less important source of state revenue is the tax on profits. Other taxes are relatively unimportant.

Recently, the Russians have become concerned with measuring the effectiveness of their capital investments realizing the inadequacy of their approach to this problem.¹⁴ Nor is there any unanimity of opinion as to how the problem should be met. What is involved is the whole question of the allocation of resources among present and future goods, of choosing between varying amounts of capital yielding time differential income streams. Several solutions offered bear a great resemblance to the orthodox concept of interest rate evaluation as an indicator of alternative choices of different production returns, the interest rate reflecting the effectiveness of capital investment generally. Russian reservations on this score are mainly due to the fact that they are ideologically committed to the labor theory of value and are thus inhibited about using orthodox tools.

The increasing concern over the problem today rather than in previous decades can be explained in terms of the greater obviousness of decisions in the past. The first Five Year Plans were primarily concerned with large projects since an industrial base was necessary. Political, ideological, and technical considerations were given the highest priority. Also there was very little skill in planning since planning only seriously began in 1929. The first years were concerned with achieving a balance in the top priority tasks rather than attempting a fine calculation of current investment decisions.

Under the theory of capitalist competition, resources are allocated in line with consumers' wants, and this applies to intermediate and final products as well as to the factors of production. Production then proceeds up to the point where costs are equal to prices and profits are the same in all industries. A balance is achieved among the various lines of economic endeavor in accord with consumer wants.

In the Soviet Union, a great deal of emphasis is also laid on the attainment of a balance in the Plan. The State Planning Commission is issued directives by the Politburo in order to ensure the proper interrelation between the different branches of the economy. The tool used to

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 309.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 310.

¹⁴D. Chernomordik, "Effectiveness of Capital Investments and the Theory of Reproduction, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, (No. 6, 1949). Translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, II, No. 1 (February 18, 1950), pp. 3-11.

ensure such interrelations is the Method of Balanced Estimates. Under this method, calculated supplies made available in the Plan are expected to correspond with the requirements of the Plan; in other words, it is expected that the Plan be internally consistent in a purely formal sense. Secondly, estimates of the technical relations involved, or technical coefficients, are made in order to ascertain the production potential. It can readily be seen that what may be technologically feasible may not be economically desirable. Prevailing economic thinking in this country is that while the problems of internal consistency and production have been more or less solved in the Soviet Union, the optimum allocation of resources has not.

The Russians, as has been shown previously, do take note of the latter problem and prices, costs, and profits do figure to some extent in resource allocation as well as decentralization of decision-making. Also there is the limited use of the interest rate in investment allocation. But these analogies, at best, are limited since resources in the Soviet Union are not allocated on the principle of consumer demand but on political, ideological, and military considerations. The emphasis on heavy industry at the price of present consumption would seem to bear out this point. Certainly this continued abstention from present consumption is not in line with consumer preferences. In 1937, for example, savings amounted to 5½ billion rubles yet government investment the same year totalled 65 billion rubles.¹⁸

There is a great deal of rigidity in any economic system. Economists have been prone to overstate the degree of technical flexibility in the allocation of resources and thus overstate the problem of planning and the attainment of an economic optimum. The technical coefficients of production are such as to significantly limit marginal substitutions. Also a few leading decisions bring with them a whole train of complementary investment decisions. Certainly these factors are saving graces with regard to the whole problem of economic waste.

The Method of Balanced Estimates does not mean that the Russians achieve full integration and proportionality, however. There are bottlenecks and this explains the Russian emphasis on inventories to meet this problem. There are also gold reserves, given access to international trade.

Marxian theory explicitly states that under socialism wage differentials will still prevail.¹⁹ Since the new society has developed out of the old, the same principles of distribution with regard to labor will be operative. The magnitude of the wage differentials will be a function of the dif-

¹⁸Abram Bergson, "Soviet National Income and Product in 1937," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1950.

¹⁹Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, (New York: International Publishers, 1938), pp. 8-9.

ferences in labor intensity and skill, as they are under capitalism. Workers would thus still be paid according to their ability rather than according to their need—the latter principle only becoming operative under full communism. Organized inequality would still remain a feature of socialist society.

Differential wages have been a feature of Soviet society since its inception.¹⁷ These wage differentials reflect the relative forces of supply and demand for different types of labor. There are also different wage scales for piece and time workers, with the scales higher in the former than in the latter. There are also differentials among industries, higher social wages prevailing in the capital goods industries.¹⁸

In 1926, 60% of the Soviet working force was on a piece rate system. By 1938, 75% of all workers in the Soviet Union were on a piece or progressive piece rate system.¹⁹

In the early days of the Soviet regime, upper and lower limits were set to piece rate earnings. By the General Law of Wages promulgated on June 17, 1920, the upper limit to such earnings was set at 100% above the basic wage rate while the lower limit to such earnings was set at not less than $\frac{2}{3}$ of the basic wage rate.²⁰ In 1934, the upper limit was abolished and changes were made in the lower limit.²¹ Since 1936, a system of premiums and bonuses have been introduced for skilled workers.²²

The range of wage differentials was greatly reduced during the period of War Communism from what it was in Tsarist times.²³ This equalization policy was primarily due to ideological reasons. During the New Economic Policy period, differentials widened in order to meet skilled labor needs. This policy was reversed from 1926 onward due to the pressure of Michael Tomskey and other trade union and Communist leaders who claimed that wage differentials as they existed in 1926 were of unheard of magnitude and contrary to the basic principles of a socialist society.²⁴ It remained for Stalin personally to take charge in this fight against the egalitarians in 1931.²⁵ Stalin claimed that wage differentials had practically ceased and that the previous wage policy was responsible for a high rate of labor turnover and the current shortage

¹⁷Abram Bergson, *The Structure of Soviet Wages*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 158.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 224, 226, 229.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 160.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 162.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 180-182.

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

of skilled labor. While the high rate of labor turnover was more a reflection of the inauguration of the Five Year Plans than a result of decreasing wage differentials, the new policy did reflect the new changes in supply and demand. Certainly wage differentials are one means of dealing with the shortages of skilled labor occasioned by the industrialization drive in the Soviet Union.

Since 1931 and the triumph of Stalin's wage policy, inequality has increased rapidly. By 1934, inequality in the Soviet Union was substantially at the pre-revolutionary level.²⁸ The multiplicity of wage scales since 1934 plus the use of the progressive piece rate system and the use of bonuses and premiums would seem to indicate even greater inequality since 1934.

Current wage determination then in the Soviet Union is a resultant of the forces of supply and demand. Wage differentials must be adequate to obtain the requisite labor force in the right occupations and in the right amounts, as these needs are seen by the decisions of the planners. Inequality is thus a necessary corollary of the incentives necessary to obtain workers for different occupations. The further question as to whether these wage differentials do not contain a great deal of economic rent and could be lowered without affecting the main bulk of the labor force is a moot point.

Surely, however, these purely economic decisions do not suffice to explain all the income inequalities in the Soviet Union. There are also political decisions which must be taken account of in explaining present-day income differentials in the U. S. S. R. There is the whole question of assuring loyalty to the State on the part of the intelligentsia and managerial groups.

In 1936, for example, 14 composers and playwrights in the Soviet Union earned more than 10,000 rubles a month. Eleven earned between 6,000-10,000 rubles, while 39 earned between 2,000-3,000 rubles a month.²⁹ Since the average wage at the time was a little better than 200 rubles a month, the range of differences between the top 14 composers and the average worker was enormous. Even after taxes, the ratio was in the neighborhood of 28:1. Such differentials cannot be explained on purely incentive terms. The differences suggest an economic rent paid to the intelligentsia in order to ensure its loyalty to the regime. The same, in lesser degree, can be said of the high salaries of managerial and technical personnel.

If one may borrow from the Marxian arsenal and make use of the dialectic for such purposes, the basic policy decision of 1928-1929 regarding industrialization and increased productivity carried with it the need

²⁸Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, (10th ed.; Moscow, 1934), pp. 451-452.

²⁹Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

³⁰*Pravda*, June 1937.

for greater incentives of all kinds which, in fact, meant increasing differences in income. This, in turn, has led to the emergence of new and privileged economic groups and an increase in social stratification within the U. S. S. R. Certainly Marx did not foresee such results when he spoke of the need for wage differentials under socialism!

There are two basic methods for the distribution of goods. One involves rationing according to specified amounts; the other the open market and freedom of choice with price bringing supply and demand into equilibrium. Implicit in Marxian thinking is the need for freedom of choice as the method to be used in the distribution of goods under a socialist system.

In roughly half the period since the Soviet Union has been in existence rationing has prevailed. This was true of the period of War Communism, the period from 1928 until 1936, and the period beginning with the outbreak of the Russo-German War in 1941 and ending in December 1947. In mitigation of the Russians, it may be said that this condition was not due to deliberate choice on their part but was the result of emergency conditions when unusual scarcity prevailed.

The Soviet rationing system is a differential rationing system.²⁸ Workers in heavy and other vital industries are given preferences in the matter of scarce commodities relative to other workers. Also workers fulfilling or overfulfilling their work norms are given preference with regard to certain scarce manufactured goods. In this manner, distribution is attached to production incentives. In the early days of Soviet experience with rationing, distinctions were made as between different social classes.

What the Soviets have attempted to do is to work out a compromise between the fact of extreme scarcity and the need for incentives, between the conflicting principles of equalitarianism and production incentives.

There is a proliferation of different shops for different groups in which rationed goods are obtainable at a fixed price. There are also many goods which are non-rationed. In 1931, the system of commercial or state shops was introduced. In these shops, scarce non-rationed goods could be obtained at much higher prices than rationed goods. For example, in 1934 the commercial shop price for rye bread in Moscow and Leningrad was four times as high as the rationed price.²⁹ The reason for the introduction of these shops is not too difficult to discern. They offered an incentive aspect so that money incomes became more meaningful. They also helped to tap excess purchasing power.

In 1932, the Soviets organized the collective farm market which is the only legally free market in the Soviet Union. Prices in this market are as high, or higher, than in the state shops and reflect the relative forces of supply and demand. If the supply in the state shops is adequate

²⁸Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-38.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 39.

relative to the demand, there is no difference in prices between the two markets. This, however, has not been the case since the inception of the collective farm market.

Even writers sympathetic to the Soviet Union assert that the system of retail distribution is one of the least successful products of the regime.²⁰ Service tends to be disinterested and slow. Little or inadequate attention is paid to local needs and tastes, or to seasonal requirements.

Conclusion

In order to make their economic system work, the Soviets have arrived by a trial and error process at the stage where they have borrowed a number of the motivations of capitalism: inequality of rewards and income, the profit motive—though not profit as a source of private income—a limited use of the interest rate as an allocator of resources, and some of the superficial aspects of competition. These borrowings certainly do not provide a warrant for the viewpoint that regards the Soviet system as closely similar to capitalism. In fact, the main essentials of the Soviet system are quite different from those of capitalism. They do provide support, however, for the assertion that a modern industrial society implies certain common problems and even certain common solutions, which are to some degree independent of the different social systems involved. The extreme claim of universal validity for the principles of classical economics is not warranted according to Soviet evidence. But neither is the Marxian claim of cultural or institutional relativism established according to the same evidence.

²⁰Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization* (2d ed.; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1937), p. 324.

Professional Organizations and Bureaucratic Government

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The characteristics of bureaucracy, which is one of the most striking features of the contemporary organization of society, are described by Max Weber in a classic essay.¹ He argues that bureaucracy is a general type of social organization, governmental and non-governmental, characterized by a hierarchic organization based on a systematic division of labor, impersonality, devotion to routine, a strong sense of status and consequent respect for authority, and continuous service and low turnover among the members of the staff. An agency bureaucratic in character is inevitably complex, operating under rules and traditions known only to professionals. Its members dispose of power, but not in any personal sense. They are bound by the rules and the division of responsibility which creates their office. An organization of this type persisting over a period of time finally becomes difficult of outside control, whether by the executive, the legislature, or the using public.

This does not sound like the usual emotional denunciation of bureaucracy in current political controversy. The critics of bureaucracy however, can well begin with this description since it includes the elementary conditions for all of the developments which have alarmed or outraged them in recent times. It is the underlying premise of this article that the shortcomings of bureaucracy are but the reverse aspects of its virtues, and that these virtues, of competence, stability and continuity need not preclude responsiveness to changing public needs. The reconciliation between the two, the reliance on bureaucracy with its mixed potentiality for good and ill, and Society's need for responsiveness to changing problems can be made in good part by the activity of professional associations. This is the role of professional organizations in society to which reference is made in the title of this piece.

Examples of the exasperating behavior of bureaucrats are familiar to us all. The clerk who keeps us waiting at a railway ticket window filling out the forms for a rerouting of our trip while the train whistles its departure from the station, the official who sarcastically informs us that we should have used form 99a instead of 99b for a tax refund, are equally behaving in the traditional fashion of bureaucrats. Universities, presumably havens of free and unbureaucratic thought, might provide their own examples. These situations have common roots in elaborate procedures which embody that minute division of labor on which many

¹Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons, trans., Oxford U. Press, 1947, pp. 337-341.

of the advantages of large scale organization rest, and on the careful following of prescribed rules and established operating traditions which is also characteristic of large enterprises. The need of the user of the service is neglected in rigid adherence to standard procedures in the general name of efficiency. To add a bit to Weber, the organization has finally come to respond more readily to the stimuli which arise within it than to those which arise from without, especially the needs of the using public which in a perfect economy of effort would determine the service provided. Correctness of form has become more important as a motive than the provision of the service which was the original purpose of the establishment.

Resent the individual manifestations of bureaucracy as we may, we cannot wholly condemn it without also condemning most of the characteristics of our own society on which high material productivity rests. Large scale organization inevitably is characterized by hierarchial organization, by division and specialization of labor, by carefully prescribed procedures, usually embodied in paper forms, by attention to precedent, by the clearance of unusual business with higher authority, and by inter-agency clearance. The scale of the organizations demanded by certain tasks both makes these features possible and requires them as a condition of its existence. The organization itself may well have come about through conscious and purposeful planning. At its peak of effectiveness it is paradoxically made to move in the habits of its individual members which embody the standards of performance, the division of work, the procedures and the levels of authority which make it an organization and not an unrelated group of individuals. Habit makes possible the reliance on the work of others which is the fundamental basis of co-operative action.

Habit is the great coordinator and simplifier of cooperative effort. Anyone who has lived through the hectic first year of any organization knows what prodigies of effort it takes to get the most necessary operations performed and the simplest of tasks standardized. Each step requires a new decision, each item of business new calculation. There is exhilaration in such effort and room for improvisation and creation, but the labor is enormous and the confusion infinite. The first year by, habits of work built up, organizational questions settled, responsibilities assigned, and the division of labor worked out, matters which at first required the direct intervention of the head man himself are done in a few moments by a subordinate, perhaps by a mere signature on a form. Habit accounts for most of the change in the form of learned reactions to recurrent situations which dispense with calculation, which let each person rely on the work of his fellow. Yet it is habit above all which the layman deplores in his dealings with big movement or big business,

habit which makes of his need a category, and deals with it in its turn, regardless of its special and unusual characteristics.

Specialization of labor means that a given individual or segment of an organization has an immediate concern only with a small part of a total problem. It means that initial contacts with an agency may not disclose who is responsible for a given situation and its representatives may have little concern with finding out who is. This is exasperating and probably calls for public relations training, but the basic situation is inescapable. If the work of the organization is to be performed with dispatch, if established precedents are to be respected, if the people concerned are to be fully informed about all matters within their province, if established channels of communication are to work as they are expected to, each unit, each individual must do his own job and not confuse affairs by taking on the work of others. However unavoidable this condition may be it is a source of distress to anyone who has a whole problem which bureaucracy will solve only by breaking it into its pieces. The general gain is obvious, but the irritation remains, and so does the need of the individual for a simple solution to his problem.

Associated with the specialization of labor in the inability to give prompt service to users is the notorious penchant of members of large agencies for pushing matters upstairs in order to avoid the need for decision. This also has its origin in the necessities of large scale effort. The achievement of a high degree of uniformity requires that a limited number of persons make decisions in exceptional cases. Since the consequences of error are often more apparent in the official world than are the advantages of immediate action, an undue number of instances may be regarded as exceptional and wait upon the decision of higher authority. Such a tendency is exaggerated when there is strong public criticism of any appearance of favoritism or prejudice. The public reaction has its effect in increased deliberation and, alas, there is new criticism of delay. Some such cycle operates in the criticism of civil service procedure for delay and excessive caution.

In our current ideology competition is the great stimulus to improvement but strangely enough in government service competition is apt to exaggerate characteristic faults rather than to minimize them. The desire for survival which forces big business to seek a cure for the excesses of its own bureaucratic tendencies may well force a government agency in competition with others for funds and political backing to find new circumlocutions and reasons for avoiding decision. The criteria by which success in public life may be judged are complex. It is easier to be wrong than to be right since obvious mistakes will soon rally the critics while success may not conciliate them. Faced with such hazards the bureaucratic organization tends to fall back on its routine procedures sure of a minimum accomplishment, knowing by

experience the best accommodation to public and legislative criticism. The routines guarantee not only a minimum accomplishment, but impartial if impersonal performance, and a regular and reliable result for those on the outside who know the organization and what buttons to push. This minimum accomplishment is no small thing.

If guaranteed minimum performance is the great result of bureaucratic methods, its worst shortcoming is readily apparent. There has not been a time in the recorded history of the world when any group of social institutions was left to grow old gracefully in refining and perfecting their traditional ways of operating without being faced by the challenge of new situations which they were not designed to meet. It is adaptability to new situations which we demand of all social institutions. In the case of bureaucracy, or public administration, we demand something more. We demand a continuous awareness of the problems of humanity which government is intended to serve, and continued awareness of the values which any given program is designed, however, imperfectly to achieve. To return to an earlier point, the agency must respond to outside stimuli as effectively as to its internal tensions and demands, and those stimuli should be the needs of society, expressed and latent. Neither survival nor success in routine performance is sufficient. The desired result is complex and probably immeasurable, as we have said in the beginning. Its achievement is nevertheless of the utmost importance to society, and the achievement requires a persistent discontent with the traditional limits of accomplishment.

But the imposition on a bureaucratic organization of a highly detailed standard of performance from the outside is difficult. The organization tends to set its own norms and its ranking members usually indicate to their political superiors the limits on the administrative possibility of achieving any social goal which may be set them. The politicians, executive or legislative, whose job it is to formulate the demands do not have the time, with the complex business which they themselves pursue, to master the leviathan, in its anatomy and procedure, so as to exercise a close and detailed control. Outside of the emergency creation and staffing of new agencies there is little that can be done to escape this condition, and while the new agencies may be expected to have a greater loyalty to new goals than the old, they can scarcely be expected to have even as much routine competence. Once the creative enthusiasm of the initial effort is spent and the smoothly moving machine created, it is, again by definition, a new element of the bureaucracy.

If the situation is exaggerated here for the sake of argument, the very real problem persists. How can either efficiency or continuous awareness of the purpose of the agency's creation be achieved, or both, when, almost inevitably, the organization itself becomes a complex mystery to all outside it and when those who constitute its mind and driving

force live in a world that touches the great world outside at all too few points?

It seems necessary to build the awareness of efficiency and of the purpose to be served into the organization itself through utilizing the creativeness of its workers from the lowest rank and file to the managers at the top. Whatever other controls may exist, it is the faithful day-by-day performance of the individual remote from the seat of authority on which all administrative accomplishment ultimately depends, through the mechanism of those very habits which are the source of strength and weakness. A strong sense of purpose, of the values to be realized through the program, is probably the most important corrective for all those evils of administration which flow from indifference, stupidity, unthinking adherence to tradition, a preference for survival to achievement. One of the causes of the evil results of bureaucracy is that the sense of purpose is weakened because of the very complexity of the environment and the reduction of the individual's importance. Under such conditions it is easy for welfare workers to process cases and not work with people and for employment service interviewers to handle applicants for orders and not men.

The immediate responsibility for developing and maintaining such a sense of purpose is of course with the executive and the administrator and it is a part of executive leadership. Albert Lepawsky has provided a needed corrective to an excessive worship of top management by reprinting in his recent book an article published years ago in *Harper's Weekly* called "Managing the Boss."² The rank and file have their own responsibility for the work of the organization and their role should not be left entirely to the hazards of changing leadership at the top. The factors which enter into the appointment or election of executives in government are often fortuitous and unrelated to the exigencies of the work at hand.

The most promising means for stimulating and releasing the creative forces of the members of the public service are organizations of their own choosing and their own creation. Unions belong under this category, but this article is particularly concerned with professional associations which are organized not immediately to solve the basic problems of wages and working conditions but to express the interest of their members in improved standards of performance and in increased mastery of a particular art. The extent of the development of professional associations is already striking, perhaps even more in the state and local services than in the federal. The creation of Public Administration Clearing House as a secretariat and service agency for a group of organizations of government officials and employees in the most varied

²*Administration*, A. A. Knopf. 1949, pp. 339-341.

fields is a most encouraging achievement, as is that of its counterpart in Great Britain, the National Association of Local Government Officers. These organizations flow directly out of the force that is of most interest to us here, concern about doing a good job and concern about carrying out a program which will meet some community problem. It is a force of which cynical commentators on the prevailing morality of government are unaware, but it can be found in the most apparently spoils ridden state administration as well as in protected preserves of the career service.

The professional organization, as Mary Parker Follett pointed out, exists to promote an interest which is broader than that of its individual members.³ It represents a conviction that the job which its members do has an important contribution to make to society, and it organizes them on the basis of that function rather than primarily on interest. As members of a professional association they are dedicated to the development of the art or skill which they serve in order that its function in society may be performed more effectively. If in that process they work to secure recognition of both their office and their function and some protection of their status, that is not necessarily a handicap. Equipped with a purpose which transcends their individual interests they have a right and a duty to evaluate the program in which they serve, to criticize it and to suggest corrections for its failures. The association enables the rank and file to pool their idealism and their capacity to develop standards of achievement and of program based on their experience, but independent of the agency in which they work. It provides them with an outlet for their own perfectionism and for their own sense of responsibility. The organization is an outside force, independent of the government and of official control, not bound to conform to established policy, but linked by common personnel to the government whose work it criticizes and appraises. Its members can use their relationship to the official organization to propose changes in program and also to make those improvements in procedure or standards which are consonant with established policy. They can, through their association, present to administrative leadership, to the legislature, and to the public the informed judgment of those who work in the program but who are not bound to it by official responsibility for what is done at present. In brief, it is the function or purpose of the administrative organization in which they serve, to which they rededicate themselves in their private capacity and which they can pursue free of some of the frustrations of official life.

It does not require more than a cursory knowledge of the work of such organizations as the American Public Welfare Association, the

³Mary Parker Follett. *Dynamic Administration*. (Metcalf & Urwick, Eds.) Harper & Bros. 1947, pp. 132-137.

American Public Health Association, the National Association of Housing Officials, the National Association of Assessing Officers, to recognize that some of the most cogent and effective criticism and some of the most promising proposals with regard to organization, procedure and program standards in their respective fields arise from these bodies. Their members are the people who often during their working lives are exposed to bureaucratic tradition of conformity, deference to authority and to established routine of which we have spoken, but who as members of independent professional groups are stimulated to make independent studies of problems and come to independent conclusions. It is in these organizations, as well as through the efforts of executives and administrators that the sense of ultimate purpose can be kept alive among the working staff and used as a measure of program and procedure.

This view of the function of professional organizations in society harks back to a pluralistic theory, but it is hard to see any other approach which will enable us to escape the monolith of governmental and economic power in the increasingly interdependent world in which we live, with its increasing dependence on a relatively small number of leaders. By forming new groups about common but not necessarily universal purposes we may hope to escape some of the consequences of large scale bureaucracy which is relatively impenetrable to individual critics, whether in office or out, and which can easily be indifferent to its failure to serve the needs that it is designed to meet.

The motive of craftsmanship, of doing a good job, is an old and honorable social force, and has made itself felt in many societies. It can be realized by individuals in combination with others as well as alone and in isolation. This force may be stimulated within an agency through an official program, but it is not wise to trust entirely to the wisdom and benevolence of those powerful administrators in whom some see our future ruling class. Rather let us, accepting the inevitability of large scale organization, accept its advantage of competence and of guaranteed standards, and attempt to offset its disadvantages by keeping alive the initiative and independence of its working members. We have as a tradition an endless variety of voluntary associations. The associations of public officials and employees organized about professional interest have an important role to play through utilizing pride in work accomplished as a motive for developing an independent appraisal of the extent to which our great administrative structure is meeting our needs, an appraisal by those who are competent to make it, and through using their collective strength to achieve more adequate adjustments to changing needs.

Recreational Use of the National Forests of Colorado

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About one-third of the total area of the state of Colorado, or approximately 20,000,000 acres, is forested, and nearly one-half of this land lies within the boundaries of various national forests. At present there are twelve national forests in Colorado, mostly located in the mountainous central and southwestern portions of the state. These forests are administered by the United States Forest Service under the principle of the greatest use for the greatest number of people for the longest period of time.

It would be difficult to overemphasize the role played by national forests in the over-all economy of Colorado, as the three major economic activities of the state, agriculture, livestock production, and recreation, are basically associated with forest lands. Directly or indirectly, the lives and welfare of most of the people of the state are influenced by the manifold uses of the highland forests. The primary functions of the forest lands include: Watershed protection, by which stream flow is regulated and maintained in an area whose economy is based largely on water; livestock pasturage, both cattle and sheep making use of the forest ranges for summer grazing; production of lumber and other wood products from the forests; and recreational activities. Thus recreation comprises but a single utilization that fits into a complex pattern of multiple-usage of the national forests in Colorado. Recreation is considered the second most important usage of these rugged lands, exceeded only by the watershed function, and its importance is increasing.

Forest recreation consists of anything done for recreative purposes in the forests, whether for amusement, diversion, education, inspiration, or spiritual value. For some people, forest recreation may involve merely enjoying the beauties of nature from their cars, while for others it means spending weeks in the "back country", leading a nearly primitive existence. Between these two extremes there are numerous intermediate variations.

Value of Forest Recreation:

Values that spring from the recreational use of forest lands are both tangible and intangible. Only the tangible values can be considered statistically, yet they may be outweighed by the intangible ones.

The most common approach in assessing a tangible value to forest recreation is to estimate the amount of money each visitor puts into the channels of trade in attaining this recreation. "The Colorado Resources Development Council determined from a 1949 questionnaire sur-

vey that the average out-of-state recreational visitor stays 14.8 days and spends an average of \$6.15 per day or \$91.00 during the season.³ Total tourist expenditures in Colorado are estimated to exceed \$150,000,000 each year; and over \$65,000,000 of that amount is considered a fair estimate of the sum spent for recreational use of the forest and mountain areas.⁴ Forest Service statistics for 1950 indicate that the 200,000 people who fished in national forest lakes and streams spent about \$3,500,000 during their fishing trips, and that the 75,000 big game hunters added \$3,750,000 to this total.⁵ The Colorado Game and Fish Commission collected well over \$2,000,000 last year for hunting, fishing, and trapping licenses. It seems probable that at least half of this revenue was derived from the fishing, hunting, and trapping resources of the national forests. The total number of recreational visits to these areas in 1950 exceeded 3,900,000; and over 2,000,000 of them were more than casual visits.⁶ It should be noted, moreover, that little of this revenue was collected from natives of Colorado. It is evident, therefore, that forest recreation has great tangible value in that section.

But Recreation involves more than the number of visits to campgrounds and the amount of money spent by each hunter. It also includes the various intangible benefits associated with life out-of-doors. It is difficult to express in words all that one sees and feels in the salubrious air of the forests. The educational, inspirational, spiritual, and social values cannot be calculated in cold statistics. This is especially true since each person finds something different in such an experience. There is much in common, however, between the exultation of the climber as he scales a rugged peak, the joy of a small child as she feeds a chipmunk, the pride of the fisherman as he lands a big trout, and the excitement of an old lady as she glimpses a porcupine from a hotel porch. The intangible values of forest recreation may exceed the tangible ones.

Colorado's Recreational Advantages:

The physical features of the state are recreational assets of outstanding value. The national forests in Colorado are primarily mountainous, but they include large meadowland and plateau areas. The glaciated high

³"Relative Use Values of Wyoming National Forests," Address delivered by E. P. Cliff, Regional Forester, in Laramie, Wyoming, on March 4, 1950, (Mimeographed copy, Denver: Forest Service Regional Office, 1950), p. 5.

⁴Joint Committee of the Society of American Foresters and the Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, *A Survey of State Forestry Administration in Colorado*, (Denver: January, 1948), p. 1.

⁵"National Forests", unpublished data prepared for the *Colorado Yearbook*, 1949-1950, (United States Forest Service Regional Office, Denver).

⁶These, and most other statistics presented in this paper, were obtained from the Regional Office of the United States Forest Service in Denver.

country presents jagged peaks, serrated ridges, precipitous cliffs, clear lakes, large snowfields, beautiful wildflowers, and glaciers. At intermediate levels the mountain streams have cut deep canyons in the forested slopes. Lower elevations are characterized by wider valleys and grassy meadows. The abundance and variety of vegetation is also a recreational advantage. Visitors from the Plains states are delighted by the various plant associations in the forests, ranging from sparse growth of brush to dense coniferous forest and to rocky meadow or tundra on the highest slopes.

The climate offers another attractive inducement to recreation-seekers. Summer is the principal tourist season, and some of the most delightful aspects of Colorado's climate are evident then. The slogan, "Cool Colorado", has little significance on the eastern plains and the western steppes and deserts, but on the forested mountain slopes the temperatures are never very high and the weather is always relatively cool. In addition, rapid nocturnal radiation gives universally cool or cold nights, and the generally low humidity affords low sensible temperatures, which makes this a restful climate. Although summer is the time of precipitation maximum over most of the state, the rain falls almost exclusively as brief afternoon showers, which do not appreciably hinder outdoor recreation. Generally speaking, the autumnal weather is even better—from a recreational standpoint—than that of summer. Lowered temperatures bring a crispness to the air. Since autumn is a transition period between the convective thundershowers of summer and the cyclonic rains of winter, precipitation is usually scant. This is accompanied by a decrease in absolute humidity. The winter climate is generally quite good for the predominant winter forest recreational use—skiing. Heavy quasi-daily snowfall in the high country combines with high sensible temperatures (brought about by low humidity) to present an almost ideal environment for winter sports enthusiasts. Spring weather is perhaps the least desirable, as far as recreation is concerned, with heavy wet snowfalls acting as harbingers of the fishing season. Yet there are many clear days during spring as well as stormy ones. It should be noted that the good features of Colorado's climate are accentuated in the national forests. For example, the altitude of the forests induces lower, and consequently more pleasant, summer temperatures. The high elevations also yield heavier and more persistent winter snowfall, which favors skiing.

As an adjunct to the numerous natural advantages for recreation, the Forest Service has adopted a vigorous and progressive policy to make the forests available and well-known to the public. With the exception of small restricted areas, the national forests are open to all types of forest recreation seekers. In some areas of heavy recreational use, any other type of usage that might conflict (such as grazing or lumbering) is pro-

hibited. In addition, the Forest Service establishes and maintains campgrounds, picnic areas, access trails, and directional signs to aid visitors in enjoying their forest recreation to the fullest.

Besides natural assets and a positive Forest Service attitude toward recreation, certain improved commercial facilities have been instituted to serve—and to profit from—the recreation-seekers. Special permits are granted for the establishment of commercial facilities within the national forests. They cover a wide variety of service, varying from ski-lifts and stables to dude ranches and resort hotels. Also, individuals may lease summer cabin sites within the forests, provided the cabins are constructed soon after the land is leased.

Types of Forest Recreation:

People who visit the forests have many different purposes. Some come to fish, some to camp, some to ski, some to hunt, some to stay at organizational camps; but the common thought of all is to enjoy themselves in the outdoors. Over 2,000,000 people engaged in planned recreational activities in Colorado's national forests in 1949. Another 4,000,000 were casual visitors, whose contacts with the forests were direct but brief. The very fact that these visitors did have different goals in mind enables us to classify them:

(1) Hunting:

Colorado's forests provide an excellent habitat for numerous game animals and birds, which attract hunters from all over the nation. Hunting is perhaps the most intensive form of forest recreation. Hunters generally stay longer, have more contacts with the forest, spend more money, and cause more problems in proportion to their numbers than any other recreational group. In 1950, approximately 83,000 licensed hunters stalked through the national forests of Colorado. They bagged 47,000 deer, 600 bear, 8,000 elk, and an undetermined number of coyotes, mountain lions, bobcats, rabbits, squirrels, pheasants, quail, doves, turkeys, grouse, pigeons, ducks, and geese. The big game kill in the national forests amounted to about half of the deer and most of the elk killed in the entire state. Probably fifteen per cent of the hunters were residents of some state other than Colorado.

(2) Fishing:

National forest fishing resources are outstanding. There are some 27,500 acres of lakes in Colorado's national forests, as well as more than 8,300 miles of streams. In 1950, there were 200,000 fishermen active in the forests. The fish resources in the national forests are managed almost exclusively by the State Game and Fish Department, which

furnishes each year from three to seven million trout for planting in the streams and lakes of the state. A large percentage of these fish are placed in national forest waters.

(3) *Other wildlife values:*

The recreation, cash income, and meat derived from hunting and fishing are only three of the many benefits that are attained from wildlife. The state's wildlife resources are tangible assets which have both economic and aesthetic values. Wildlife benefits not directly connected with hunting and fishing include knowledge derived from biological study; income obtained from furs, hides, and other by-products; pleasure gained by naturalists and photographers; and certain services rendered man by wildlife (such as insect and rodent control, sanitation, and fertilization).

The national forests provide food and shelter for a large proportion of the more important wildlife species of the state. Many of the animals that now inhabit the forests were originally plains and foothills dwellers, but with human settlement and occupancy of their natural ranges, they were forced to seek new feeding grounds in the high country. Practically all big game animals of Colorado—except the antelope which is a plains animal—are dependent upon the national forests for survival. The forests afford approximately ninety per cent of their summer range, and even a portion of the winter range. Most winter ranges, however, are located below the forest boundaries where winter conditions are less hostile than in the high country. In like manner, a majority of Colorado's fur-bearers depend upon the national forests for food, shelter, and protection.

(4) *Camping and Picnicking:*

Campers and picknickers are classified together because these two groups of users probably benefit most from Forest Service recreational developments. There are 193 developed camping and picnic areas in the national forests of Colorado. In 1940, over 875,000 visits were made to these areas. The various camp and picnic grounds are ordinarily equipped with running water, tables and benches, fire-grates, garbage containers, incinerators, comfort stations, firewood, and parking areas. Although a few of the campgrounds are away from any road, most of them are accessible for automobiles. Camping is permitted outside designated campgrounds if certain basic rules pertaining to fire and sanitation are observed.

(5) *Hiking and Climbing:*

Hiking and mountain climbing are still other parts of the recreational

picture. Often these two activities encompass camping, but perhaps more often the hiker or climber will be in the forest for one day or less at a time. Over 12,000 miles of trails wind through Colorado's national forests.⁵ These trails, along with more than forty fourteen-thousand foot peaks and hosts of imposing but slightly lower summits, attract the foot-traveler and horseback-rider. In addition, the cool, fairly dry summer weather in the forests is an inducement. Various hiking and climbing clubs are active in the state, particularly in the summer. The Colorado Mountain Club is perhaps the best known of these organizations. Various useful services are performed by this club, including rescue work, reforestation, publicity, and some trail-blazing.

(6) *Winter sports:*

Heavy winter snowfall in the mountains combines with high sensible temperatures to make Colorado a mecca for lovers of winter sports. Skiing, the most important, is rapidly gaining in popularity. Other snow-time activities, such as ice-skating, sledding, and snowshoeing, achieve local popularity, but none of these can challenge the dominant position of skiing. Approximately 145,000 visits were made to more than half a hundred developed winter sports areas in the national forests of Colorado last winter. In addition, an unknown number of people indulged in cross country skiing—the acme of the skiers' sport—in the high country of the national forests. Except for a few winter sports areas that are developed on private land and in the Hidden Valley area in Rocky Mountain National Park, nearly all of the choice ski slopes of Colorado are within the boundaries of the national forests. The large number of developed ski areas in the state and the ample room for expansion, combined with near optimum winter climatic conditions and adequate winter transportation, give Colorado three of the four prerequisites to becoming the outstanding winter sports center in America. Unfortunately, the fourth essential—numerous, large, near by urban communities—is lacking.

(7) *Miscellaneous Forest Recreation:*

Miscellaneous forms of forest recreation in Colorado include the activities undertaken during visits to organizational camps, recreational residences, dude ranches, and resorts. In 1950 the national forests entertained approximately half a million visitors of this type.

Recreation as an Industry in Colorado:

It is becoming evident that forest recreation is a year-round business

⁵Jay Clapp and Paul Stevens, *A Geography of Colorado*, (Denver: The Old West Publishing Company, 1949), p. 39.

in Colorado. No longer do the resort towns of the mountains "roll up their sidewalks" after Labor Day when most of the summer tourists leave. There soon begins an early fall influx of visitors who come knowing that the most delightful season of the year in the Colorado mountain and forest country is autumn. The pleasant autumn weather and an ebb in the tide of summer business combine to make the fall a time of forest recreation for native Coloradoans, as well as visitors. On the heels of these recreationists come the hunters, both resident and non-resident, pursuing deer, elk, bear, waterfowl, and upland game. Even before the hunters have faded from the picture, winter sports enthusiasts take their places. The ski slopes at Berthoud Pass, Winter Park, and dozens of other areas remain crowded until the sunshine of late spring begins to make the snow slushy. At that time, the inhabitants of near-by plains cities and rural areas seem to rediscover the mountains. Whenever travel is possible, the forest highways are crowded with citizens eager to have a picnic, take photographs, or merely gaze at the scenery. By late May, the fishing season has opened and the high altitude streams and lakes are swarming with fishermen. Then the tourists begin to arrive again, coming from near and far, from nearly every state in the Union, and from various foreign countries. From June till September—from Memorial Day till Labor Day—the tourist trade swells to a crescendo. This completes the annual cycle of forest recreation.

Forest recreation in Colorado, with all its ramifying aspects, occupies the position of an outstanding industry, an industry whose raw materials are inexhaustible. Although much can be done to attract visitors (such as increased Congressional appropriations to enable the Forest Service to maintain and improve the recreational and transportation facilities in the forests), the natural advantages of the area represent the most stable aspect of the industry. The market for these recreational raw materials is the unstable factor. A comprehensive campaign should be undertaken to "sell" Colorado's recreational features to the nation, rather than continue the disorganized, half-hearted promotion that is now being practiced. Along with this "sales campaign" the widespread improvement of highways is needed, to speed the consumers to the market. Such an extensive, well-planned operation should stabilize and help insure the prosperity of the recreation industry in Colorado.

The Role of the Social Scientist

DANIEL KADING

The University of Texas

In a recent interesting article in this *Quarterly* the view was suggested that "the proper function of the social sciences is to study social situations involving a conflict of norms and to state the results of these studies so that they can be used by the people to resolve these conflicts."¹ My main purpose in this paper will be to examine the problems besetting a social scientist who accepts this as his function, but first I shall consider briefly the claim that this is *the* proper function of the social sciences.

I

Probably few would challenge the well-known charge that there are not enough persons concerned with integrating the social sciences or with relating the findings of these studies to important social problems. "Knowledge for what?" remains a pertinent question. But the dearth of persons engaged in these activities is no ground for disparaging specialized research as such. The specialist is necessary to provide the information needed by the integrator, and few persons are capable of doing justice to both functions. The proportion of those who are specialists to those whose concern is with the application of information to broad social problems may be too great, yet it would seem to be an over-statement to insist that all of the people in the social sciences should be *directly* concerned with the latter function.

But if fact-finding in the social sciences is for the sake of the furtherance of social harmony, then at least it would seem that those who limit themselves to the accumulation of a certain array of facts ought to choose their subject-matter on the basis of possible relevance to this end. Here however the situation is perhaps not unlike that in the physical sciences. There are those who investigate a problem because they are stimulated by concern with some social end to which the problem seems relevant, and there are also those who explore the problem for its own sake without reference to any ulterior end, simply because they are interested. The curious thing is that the "purists" (i. e., the latter group) do seem on the whole, without any specific intention of doing so, to justify their existence from a social point of view, for their findings are frequently as useful or more useful than those of their more socially-minded colleagues. But this is a matter for a careful statistical study, and we need do no more than suggest that the purist approach may be a useful complement to the instrumental one. Thus, even if

¹David L. Miller, "Norms, Values, and the Social Sciences," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. December, 1951, p. 148.

one's goal is to contribute to social harmony, it may in some instances be better to forget the goal, concentrating on those problems which seem to be of interest for their own sake.

There is, however, no necessary reason why any social scientist ought either directly or indirectly to be concerned with the achievement of social harmony; such a concern is an ethical commitment which so far as I know no candidate for the Ph.D. in the social sciences is required to make. All that is necessary for one to become a social scientist in the ordinary sense is that the subject-matter of his investigation fall within the vague limits of his field as conventionally defined, and that he more or less employ in an efficient way the accredited tools and techniques used in that field. Speaking from the context of a democratic society, we find it alien to insist that anyone subscribe to any particular ethical principle; rather, we allow him the freedom to make his own commitments in his own way. We admit his right to choose his own end whether it be knowledge for knowledge's sake, social harmony, social disharmony or something else. Mr. Miller's recommendation is of course not to be construed as an attempt to abrogate the social scientist's freedom; he is asserting that the social scientist, as the man who is in the best position to study it, has an obligation to investigate this vitally important problem of social conflict. There are two assumptions here, both of which might be challenged: (1) that the elimination of social conflict is desirable, and (2) that everyone in a position to do so ought to study the problem. Most persons would accept (1) but there are exceptions, e.g., those who would extend Darwinian theory to ethics; we should not ask these latter to work for social harmony but should try to prove to them that their ethics is mistaken. Ought those who accept (1) also accept (2)? It would seem so if they are committed to serving the "general welfare," and if they believe the study of social conflict is the most significant way in which it can be served. But I know of no conclusive way in which it can be proved to a man that he ought to serve the "general welfare." In any case there are a good many social scientists who would make this commitment; even these, however, would not commit themselves primarily to the elimination of social conflict unless they believed that this was the most significant way in which they as social scientists could render a service to the community. The decision here would depend on two factors: an evaluation of what the community most needs—social harmony *might not always* be the community's paramount need²—and an evaluation of what the individual social scientist in terms of his own peculiar abilities and interests might most successfully contribute.

²This point will be illustrated in Part II.

All social scientists, then, should not be concerned with the resolution of social conflict unless "social science" be construed in an unusually narrow sense. Yet many of them are convinced of the vital importance of the problem and do have an active interest in contributing to its solution, and perhaps many more would be actively concerned if they were more clear as to what the problem involved. In the next section I shall try to clarify some of the more important implications of this problem.

II

For the discussion so far I have relied on the reader's intuitive notion of the terms "social conflict" and social harmony," but for the discussion below it will be necessary to be considerably more precise. A good definition of social conflict is by no means easy not only because of the complexity of the concept but also because of the variety of ways in which it is used. We may say that a social conflict exists when one person (or group of persons) actively desires to bring about a state of affairs that another person (or group of persons) actively desires not to have brought about. The phrase "actively desires" means that a person will through overt action attempt to bring about the desired state of affairs if he is not prevented from so doing by forceful restraint, fear of punishment, or physical incapacity.² It follows from this definition that conflict can exist when one of the parties involved is able to force the other to abide by its program of action. This usage may seem unusual since we tend to think of conflict as overt conflict, but I think the usage is justified on the ground that the overt harmony of affairs is not a genuine harmony from the standpoint of the parties being suppressed. Genuine social harmony in an area means that all of the parties involved actively desire, or are not opposed to, the existence of a certain state of affairs.

According to the definition, conflicts of means and conflicts of ends are equally cases of social conflict since both have reference to some desired state of affairs. It might be suggested that the definition of social conflict be limited to conflict of ends since conflict of means constitutes a merely technical or engineering problem, but this seems either mistaken or misleading. Means can always be evaluated from the standpoint of their own intrinsic worth or end-value as well as from the standpoint of their instrumental value. The easiest and most efficient means for eliminating a toothache, e.g., is to destroy the organism that is suffering; we choose less effective means because this particular one

²Dr. Miller defines social problems in terms of conflict of norms, and he distinguishes *social* problems from *technical* ones. My definition of social conflict differs from his definition of conflict of norms primarily in that it does not distinguish between social and technical problems, i.e., between problems of ends and problems of means. My reasons for not making this distinction will be indicated.

is considered to be bad as an end. Further, means always have consequences besides those for which they are designed; forceful suppression of "subversive" groups is a means for eliminating a threat to orderly government—it may also be a means to dictatorship. Thus there is never in actual affairs the simple engineering question of merely finding the most efficient means to a specified end: to define social conflict in terms of ends exclusively is to fail to recognize the intimate way in which means and ends are actually related.

In terms of the above definition, what role can the social scientist play in the alleviation of social conflict? The problem reduces to the selection of appropriate techniques for modifying those desires which are in conflict.⁴ Ideally, in the interest of neutrality it might seem that the social scientist should simply explicate the full consequences of competing positions in an area of conflict, leaving it to the public to modify its attitudes in the light of fuller knowledge; this procedure would certainly be in keeping with democratic theory.⁵ But this viewpoint is subject to an insuperable objection: it is not possible to conduct such an ethically neutral investigation. Within the limits of his presuppositions the investigator can strive for impartiality, but his presuppositions are by no means ethically neutral.

What, e.g., makes a particular social conflict important enough to merit investigation? The social scientist must have some criterion for judging importance, i.e., he must make an ethical judgment as to what is of most value for the group which he wishes to serve. Without such a basic judgment he will be in no position to investigate social conflict unless his area of investigation is prescribed for him by some higher authority. He might—and this would appear to be thoroughly democratic—investigate those problems which the general public is most concerned about, but it is well-known that public concern does not always adequately mirror the importance of a problem. The social scientist would hardly wish to forego the important problems with which he thinks the public ought to be concerned but is not. He must, therefore, on the basis of his own ethical insight settle upon a criterion of importance and select his problem accordingly.

Having selected a problem for investigation, the social scientist is not thereby freed from any further ethical considerations. There exist lit-

⁴In the long run, the modification of some desires will make the modification of certain others unnecessary. Thus agreement on compulsory birth-control techniques throughout the world now might mean that eventually one could desire to have enough to eat without conflicting with those many others who have the same desire. But in the short run, although more equal distribution, more efficient agricultural methods, etc. would alleviate the conflict, nothing—barring a miracle of chemistry—would resolve it except the modification of the desire to eat enough on the part of a considerable segment of the world's population. Would we choose to resolve the conflict in this way if we had the available techniques?

⁵In his article, Dr. Miller recommends this method.

erally an infinite number of ways of resolving any given problem of social conflict, and the social scientist must decide which of these he will explore. Will he, e.g., limit himself to those solutions most likely to gain acceptance or will he concentrate on those which he considers reasonably fair and just? Clearly, it is not merely the investigation of possible solutions that constitutes his interest: it is the investigation of solutions that are both just and practical. The society depicted by George Orwell in *1984* was eminently satisfactory from the point of view merely of eliminating social conflict—men were trained so that their dominant desires were those of the State. But many of us believe that what the citizens of *1984* desired, however harmonious, was not desirable. If one were to attempt to depict with sufficient precision to be meaningful his conception of the good life for the individual in society, he would find that very few persons would agree with him completely and many would disagree markedly. Yet it is precisely one's conception of the good life—whether explicitly stated or merely implicit—that must lie at the root of any recommendations for resolving social conflict. Thus the social scientist who tackles the problem must be a moralist, and it is important that he recognize that fact if he is to make it clear to himself and to others the exact relationship between his ethical premises and his recommendations. In these terms the social scientist has three functions: (a) the critical examination of his ethical premises—he should make them as clear as possible, and he should be able to justify them;⁹ (b) the explication of the consequences of these premises for an actual social order; and (c) concrete recommendations as to how that order might be brought about. How can the successful performance of these functions induce a widespread modification of desires that will promote social harmony?

In the first place, it is clear that those whose basic ethical premises differ radically and consistently from those to which the particular social scientist examining a problem is committed are not likely to be much moved by his recommendations. Thus recommendations addressed to those who have no interest in mediating conflict—who would in fact like to promote it—would be pointless *if* those persons understood the full implications of their position. But one can never be sure that this is the case; it may be possible to demonstrate to them that their own desires are inconsistent, leading them to pursue contradictory goals. More generally, wherever a conflict exists in which one or several of the parties involved hold inconsistent personal views, there is hope for its resolution at least in part by pointing out those inconsistencies, those

⁹ I do not mean to suggest that there is a rigorous and conclusive method for "justifying" moral judgments. The problem of justification is highly complex and involved. But the social scientist should be well acquainted with this problem, and in a position to justify his premises at those levels where justification, in some significant sense, is possible. A clearcut statement of the problem may be found in C. L. Stevenson's *Ethics and Language*.

guilty of inconsistency may of course not choose to be consistent, or they may harmonize their personal views in a way that accentuates rather than resolves the problem.

It should be emphasized that the conscious desire to have a thing and not to have it at the same time is only the extreme and pathological case of inconsistent personal desires. The usual case is that in which the individual is unconscious of the fact that he is working to achieve two goals which in terms of a given environment cannot coexist; only an elaborate causal investigation into the total situation—not a psychoanalysis—can reveal such an inconsistency. The source of inconsistent action, where it is not traceable to an unwillingness or inability to harmonize recognized inconsistencies, is simply confusion about or lack of knowledge of the environmental situation. The classic case, for example, in which carriers of iron ingots and their employers were in conflict over the number of working hours, was for a time neatly resolved by studies showing that more work was actually accomplished by working fewer hours—the working hours desired by the employers were shown to be in conflict with their aim of maximizing labor efficiency.

Although internal inconsistency probably always plays some role in all conflict there are undoubtedly a large number of situations in which however consistent the positions in conflict may be, there is simply no solution which in the short run would be genuinely desirable for all parties concerned. But there is still the worthwhile task of exploring long-range possibilities together with present means for their attainment, for so long as conflicting groups have at least one important aim in common—the aim of peace, e.g.—there will be an incentive to harmonize other goals with this one so that it may not be lost. For those social scientists willing to take a stand on what is good and bad in the world, there will be no shortage of problems worthy of investigation.

Book Reviews

Edited by H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

WILLIAM CULP DARRAH: *Powell of the Colorado*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, Pp., 426, \$6.00.)

In the book *Powell of the Colorado*, a once famous and influential scientist, now nearly forgotten, is made to live again. In the late 1890's John Wesley Powell was perhaps the outstanding figure in science in America, but at the middle of the twentieth century, was remembered, if at all, as the explorer of the Colorado and the Grand Canyon.

The highlights in the life of Powell, sometimes almost indistinguishable in the maze of intimate detailed trivia in the book include that of teacher, explorer, union soldier, promoter of scientific research, crusader for the discovery and beneficial use of the resources of the vast west which he explored, Director of the Bureau of Ethnology, Director of the United States Geological Survey, and writer, the bibliography of his writings listing two hundred and fifty-one items. He wrote in various fields, thus achieving little recognition as a specialist. It should be noted further that his disquisitions on science have found little favor among mid-twentieth century scientists.

Powell achieved fame mainly as a trail blazer. He led the way to the top of Pike's Peak and Long's Peak; he was the first to follow the perilous route of the Grand Canyon; he was in the forefront in advocating reclamation and conservation even long before Theodore Roosevelt's time; he interested Congress in scientific research which led to the establishment of the American Bureau of Ethnology of which he became director; and the United States Geological Survey was organized as a result largely of his insistence. In all these fields Powell achieved a place as an American benefactor. Perhaps, however, his most unique accomplishment was that of winning an argument ten years after his death. He was a self-made scientist and was closely associated with W. G. McGee, another scientist who taught himself. On one occasion these men fell into an argument about who had the largest brain. It was agreed that each would bequeath his head to science and after death the argument could be determined. Powell died in 1902 at the age of sixty-eight. Ten years later when McGee died scientists made the measurements. Powell won.

Meticulous scholarship is in evidence on every page of the book; and otherwise little is left to be desired with the exception, perhaps, that one might wish that the details might be less voluminous or that the style might be a trifle more spritely. Scientists will enjoy the book but it is particularly recommended for those slaves to security who would prefer to break away from the conventional and traditional but do not have

the courage to do so as Powell did. Thus in reading Darrah's book they may leave, momentarily, the security of their drab lives and climb the highest mountains, follow Indian trails, navigate strange rivers, see the wonders of unknown canyons, and fight for their lives as they plunge into the mad, swirling waters of river rapids.

Southwest Texas State Teachers College

Claude Elliott

BETTY TABLEMAN: *Governmental Organization in Metropolitan Areas*, Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 21. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1951, Pp., 137, \$2.50.)

A standard metropolitan area, according to the 1950 Census, is an area in which there is located "a central city (or cities) of at least 50,000 population plus the county containing the city and any other contiguous counties" which are integrated closely with such city. Over half (56%) of the population of the U. S. lives within 168 so-called standard metropolitan areas.

The population of these metropolitan areas has flowed beyond the central city—settling in unincorporated areas and suburban cities. This movement of the population from the central city into the fringe area has been referred to as the "disease of suburbanitis" by Dr. Thomas H. Reed. As a result, area-wide problems have been created which cannot be handled adequately by the independent action of local units of government located within a particular metropolitan area. "The exigencies of twentieth century living have outrun an eighteen-century governmental structure". Therefore, an examination of the various means of integrating government in the metropolitan area is, indeed, a timely matter.

Part I of the study is devoted to an examination of the various techniques which have been suggested and used for improving government in metropolitan areas. In this section the author considers such matters as: (1) annexation of outlying areas by the central city, (2) establishment of a "federated metropolis", (3) city-county consolidation and city-county separation, (4) creation of the so-called metropolitan city-state, (5) incorporation, and (6) the reorganization of county government. Thus, most of these techniques involve either structural reorganization or strengthening governmental structure and powers in the outlying areas.

After surveying the various suggestions relating to structural reorganization, the author concludes that efforts to change "the jerry-built governmental structure is a slow, tedious process subject to public inertia, innumerable delays, and failure". Regardless, local officials have been compelled to adopt less extreme methods in order to meet problems which arise from day to day. Therefore, the metropolitan problem becomes one of expediency—using practicable techniques which require no fundamental change in structure.

The expedient approach involves "some type of intergovernmental arrangement which leaves the structure of government untouched, but provides a means of meeting a particular problem at a particular time through voluntary co-operation". Thus, functional consolidation is not only feasible, but represents a step toward metropolitan integration. This leads to an analysis of the various types of intergovernmental arrangements. "(1) provisions whereby the county undertakes a function for its subsidiary units; (2) sale or provision of services by the central city to other cities and unincorporated areas (or in some instances directly to consumers in outlying areas); (3) undertakings by two or more governmental units with joint ownership and operation of facilities or joint financing of a program; . . . (4) metropolitan planning, . . ."; and (5) metropolitan special districts.

The author admits that the two solutions—co-operative arrangements and structural reorganization—are not mutually exclusive since both approaches can be utilized. Nevertheless, "In most areas with deep-rooted traditions of local independence, functional consolidation must precede structural reorganization. As the web of functional interdependence grows, a metropolitan consciousness may develop to the point where actual structural integration becomes possible".

Part II is concerned with "The Metropolitan Problem in Michigan"—indicating the method and extent to which the various techniques have been used in the latter state.

This reviewer made no attempt to check all the factual material presented in the study. Nevertheless, a casual check did reveal certain errors. For example, the chart in Appendix A, page 145 lists only one joint city-county program in Dallas County—that being the city-county hospital. Other joint arrangements in Dallas County include the city-county Welfare Board, the city-county Boys Industrial Home Board, and the joint city-county road program. Furthermore, there are five counties in Missouri (instead of four, p. 19) which have more than 85,000 inhabitants—Buchanan (St. Joseph), Greene (Springfield, Jackson Independence, Jasper (Carthage), and Saint Louis (Clayton) counties. Notwithstanding the errors; the author has made a valuable contribution to better understanding the problems and government in metropolitan areas. Those wishing to make a similar study in some local area will find the study and list of references very helpful.

Southern Methodist University

W. E. Benton

GARDINER WILLIAMS: *Humanistic Ethics*: (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, Pp., 223, \$3.75.)

This book is a clear and simple exposition of hedonic individual relativism. The good is whatever satisfies, and the highest good whatever

gives the greatest satisfaction in the long run. True ethics is selfish in a Pickwickian sense of having some reference to self. What satisfies one may dissatisfy another; the good is therefore relative to the individual. Utilitarianism is true insofar as the individual cannot be fully satisfied outside society. To escape is good from the criminal's viewpoint; his punishment is good from society's viewpoint. Conflict here is settled by force, for I will always see another's viewpoint from my viewpoint. One who derives the greatest satisfaction from crime and is sure of getting away with it has both the right and the duty to commit the crime, for to seek the maximum of satisfaction is the categorical imperative. There follows a hedonistic calculus of persistent human motivations in their relative importance.

The physical underpinning for this ethical system is emergent evolutionary naturalism. Consciousness is an emergent from the basic world stuff, probably energy, when it gets arranged into a nervous system. Despite inexplicable emergents, every event is inexorably determined by natural law and causation. Conflict between freedom and determinism is only apparent. A person does what he chooses because he must choose what he prefers, and must prefer what his heredity and environment make him prefer. He is thus free to choose what he does and do what he chooses; his acts are voluntary and for them he is responsible. By so defining freedom that it means unfreedom, freedom is reconciled with determinism.

The supreme being, structured energy, which does everything, both good and evil, is distinguished from God, the abstract principle or ideal. Religion has value if it transcends the immaturity and mythology of the supernatural.

Epicureanism, here adapted to modern use, always has its appeal. Others with a different metaphysical outlook find it, as a philosophy, sadly lacking in the hedonic tone of intellectual satisfaction. For them it fails by its own criterion.

University of Santa Clara

Austin Fagothey, S. J.

TALCOTT PARSONS: *The Social System*: (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1951, \$4.50.)

Professor Parsons' new book, in part, recapitulates materials presented earlier in his *The Structure of Social Action*, 1937, and *Essays in Sociological Theory*, 1949. There is enough that is entirely new, however, to make the volume eminently worth study.

The social system is defined by the author as "... a mode of organization of action elements relative to the persistence or ordered processes of change of the interactive patterns of a plurality of individual actors." Each individual actor participates in a pattern of these relationships, and the concepts of *status* and *role* are usable for sociological analysis of such

participation. He outlines a set of "functional prerequisites" or conditions necessary if a social system is to "constitute a persistent order or to undergo an orderly process of development."

One of the major themes of this work is the same as that of Professor Parsons' previous volumes: the essence of theory in sociology is the theory of "institutional behavior." Institutions are defined as patterns of "role-expectations" held by members of a society. It is for use in the analysis of regulative and cultural institutions, as well as the "role structure" of the social system that the author has developed his "pattern-alternatives of value-orientation" or "pattern variables of role-definition." These concept pairs (affectivity—affective neutrality; self-orientation—collectivity-orientation; universalism—particularism; achievement—ascription; specificity—diffuseness) are among the most impressive contributions of the book, and are used in classifying societies into four major structural types.

Other chapters in the book are devoted to such topics as deviant behavior, social control, the mechanisms of socialization, expressive symbolism and communication, and social change. Students of social control will be interested in Professor Parsons' detailed analysis of the motivation of deviant behavior. One chapter is a kind of case study of the medical profession, and the volume ends with a summary chapter concerned primarily with a classification of the "sciences of action."

Some scholars may question certain assumptions in the book (such as the statement that the tendency to maintain a given social state is the "first law of social process"). Others may regret that the author chose to concern himself with theory to the almost complete exclusion of the methodology of functional analysis. Finally, it is unfortunate that the book is written in a generally involved language. These criticisms are minor, however, and the work deserves the careful attention of social scientists.

University of Colorado

Blaine E. Mercer

JOSEPH H. FICHTER: *Southern Parish, Vol. I, The Dynamics of a City Church*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, Pp., 283, \$5.00.)

This is the first of a projected four-volume study of the organization and operation of a Roman Catholic parish. After a brief statement of his sectarian bias, the author defines the parish as an "ecclesiastical microcosm—the 'Church in miniature'"—and briefly describes the parish selected for investigation, as well as the 23,621-population community of Riverside in which it is located, in both ecological and statistical terms. The following ten chapters are devoted chiefly to descriptions of the ways in which the sacraments of the Roman Church are practiced and an enumeration of the numbers of parishioners who participate in them and how regularly or actively they participate. Six additional chapters

are given over to a full description of related religious observances and a final chapter reports the results of a questionnaire of sixteen items designed to reveal the degree of orthodoxy in the thinking and attitudes of sixty-eight lay parishioners, chosen from among "the inner circle of the parish."

As is perhaps apparent from the foregoing, this study is primarily descriptive rather than analytic and predictive in a scientific sociological sense. Except for the fact that comparatively little information is given in this volume concerning the financial income and expenditures of the parish or other of the more mundane matters essential to the operation of the organization, this is a careful and apparently thorough study. It makes no effort to sugar-coat any of what are taken to be shortcomings of the parish, its priests or its laymen. As a result this and the volumes to come promise to be especially useful to Catholic church leaders as well as to social scientists interested in source materials for a sociology of religion.

One helpful feature of the book is the brief explanation, given in connection with several of the chapters on the sacraments, of the meanings of these practices for Catholics, although at this point, as well as in the highly partisan first chapter, the author ceases to be scientific and turns theologian. Such assertive statements as "Baptism leaves an indelible mark on the soul" or "the Church, *by the intention of Christ*, is all-embracing in its membership" (italics mine) are, presumably, entirely beyond the competence of social or any other kind of science. It is these lapses from even the *descriptive* level of science—in addition to a doctrinaire tone in the first chapter—that will probably keep this volume from being acceptable to sociologists as a scientific study. The author is entitled to his belief, which he quite frankly avows on page 1, that "the reintegration of modern Western society, particularly on the American scene, can take place only through the agency of Christianity in the form of the Roman Catholic Church;" but it might be pointed out that this notion collides head on with a liberal democratic view which holds that the best guarantee of unity is the acceptance by all of the principle that each person must be allowed the necessary freedom to seek his religious values, worship God, discover moral and ethical truth in his own way. To the extent that he fails to concede—or apparently even to be aware of the fact—that this latter ideology has offered and still provides an important and effective basis for consensus not only in the local and national community but in the potential world community, the author disqualifies himself as a scientific sociologist in any thoroughgoing sense of the term. For while a sociologist may and must have personal biases and values in order to function as a human being, these biases must not (if he is to function as a scientist) be permitted to

blind him to facts which his competently trained fellows are able to observe.

Southern Methodist University

Allan W. Eister

LAWRENCE L. DURISCH and HERSHAL L. MACON: *Upon Its Own Resources*. (University of Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1951, Pp., 136, \$3.00.)

This small book is the seventh and concluding volume of a series growing out of a conference in the fall of 1944 of representatives of seven southern universities and the Tennessee Valley Authority on regional aspects of public administration in the South. The purpose chosen by the conference concerned the administration of governmental programs dealing with natural resources in the South. Six state studies preceded this volume and appeared in 1947 and 1948.

The volume emphasizes the responsibility of the states for natural resource programs and recognizes the important influence which the states exert or can exert on both federal and local activities. The nature or extent of desirable state action or the exact division of resource program responsibilities among federal, state, and local jurisdictions are not indicated. Moreover, the boundary between spheres of governmental and non-governmental action is not covered in the report. Instead, the report stresses the importance of achieving sound and progressive administration of whatever resource programs are undertaken.

The volume is divided into six main sections, the first of which gives a brief history of the role of government in the use and control of natural resources, including a brief analysis of the conservation movement. This section concludes that the relation of government to natural resources is a changing and expanding one and that the various resource activities have become sufficiently extensive to constitute a major function of government.

The second section discusses the resources of the Southeast and points out that this region is one of the most studied parts of the nation. This section concludes that the natural resources and resource potentialities of the Southeast appear adequate in quality, quantity, and variety to support income levels much higher than those prevailing. The wide gap which separates potential from performance in the Southeast is a great challenge to public and private efforts.

Section three discusses current resource programs in the region and points out that, except for wartime interruptions, resource activities have been experiencing steady growth during recent years. Federal and state agricultural programs in which soil conservation has occupied a central position have been given major emphasis, and federal projects for navigation, flood control, power, and related river improvement purposes are the most spectacular of the resource-related activities.

Section four discusses resource agencies concerned with these programs and emphasizes that the existence of so many separate resource agencies is, "... an invitation to misunderstandings, conflicts, and duplications."

Section five discusses administrative management encompassing a wide variety of agency procedures and practices through which legislative authorizations are translated into program activities.

The final section of the volume discusses resource program planning, agency organization, interagency relations, intergovernmental relations, and research and education. Among the more significant recommendations for constructive programs are establishment of an advisory resource commission, a consolidated executive resource program and performance budget, a joint legislative committee to consider the executive resource program, effective integration of divisional activities within the resources department, comprehensive resource agency reports, a long-range educational program through the public schools, and a regional advisory council for resource development.

This little volume is concise, well written, and emphasizes the fundamental principles that should be kept constantly in mind if sound and progressive administration of resource programs is to be achieved. All those interested in natural resources and public administration will find a careful reading of this little volume stimulating and helpful.

Montana State College

Roland R. Renne

GORDON W. ALLPORT: *The Nature of Personality: Selected Papers.* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1950, Pp., 220, \$2.50.)

If we rejoice . . . that present-day psychology is . . . increasingly *empirical, mechanistic, quantitative, nomothetic, analytic, and operational*, we should also beware of demanding slavish subservience to these presuppositions. Why not allow psychology as a science—for science is a broad and beneficent term—to be also *rational, teleological, qualitative, idiographic, synoptic, and even non-operational?*

It takes a brave man to speak these words today; particularly so, when the speaker is professionally involved in the field to which the words are relevant. Gordon Allport is no pallid humanist, criticizing the conquering sciences of man from the shelter of a dusty, bookish cloister. He has been and is a full participant in the empirical, mechanistic, quantitative, nomothetic, analytic, and operational approach to social psychology. Yet he has refused to allow his own approach to the field to be strait-jacketed by narrow methodological orthodoxy. For this refusal, social psychologists owe him a great debt.

The freshness of this man's scientific orientation is apparent throughout this small book of reprinted articles. Here are treated at greater length

several of the concepts originally set forth in his *Personality*: the functional autonomy of motives; idiography in social psychology; the ego; the nature and importance of attitudes; and others. In each case the writing is clear, precise, and logically structured. Yet it is flexible and capable of describing subtleties frequently lost in the "scientific" writing of today. Humanists reading this book may take hope that the sciences of man are not of necessity destructive of the humanity of man. Perhaps the scientific reader may conclude that there is an affinity between the scientific approach to man and the humanists' understanding of man; that there can be depth and subtlety in the analysis of human nature without laxity in method and observation.

If social science is to be an instrument of liberation, rather than a tool for manipulation, the spirit that pervades this book must spread throughout the social disciplines. The concepts and arguments concerning concepts developed here will almost surely be superseded, if they are not, in some cases, already obsolete. That is to be expected in scientific writing. But one can hope that the generous conception of science, utilized without loss of lucidity and preciseness, which characterizes all of Allport's work will stand permanently as a barrier in the path of those who would sacrifice the subject, man, for a spuriously conceptualized idea of science and scientific method.

Newcomb College, Tulane University

William L. Kolb

J. TINBERGEN: *Econometrics*. (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1951, Pp., 258, \$4.50.)

Translated from the original work written in Dutch and revised and enlarged, this book seeks to introduce the teacher and student of economics to the field of econometrics. It is an effort, not only to explain the interrelationships among economics, mathematics, and statistics, but also to survey the fields to which a majority of econometric literature has been devoted. Both objectives are accomplished in an orderly and readable fashion.

As stated by the author, an understanding of the book requires no advanced mathematics, but only a working knowledge of algebra. In places, that knowledge must be rather complete. An adequate foundation in orthodox economic theory is, of course, assumed. A large part of the book is devoted to explaining how ordinary economic principles are reduced to mathematical terms, without, in many cases, explaining what one can do with these symbolic statements after he has them. In several instances, the reduction of a theory to mathematical terms complicates rather than simplifies it. The author emphasizes that econometric tools do not replace logic in economics, but merely expand the usefulness of the logic. After an economic problem is analyzed, it is the function of the mathematical economist to "derive the relationships

from the premises and specify that relationship in greater detail." Numerous examples of this mathematical form for both macroeconomic and microeconomic problems are included in the book.

Following the processes of logical formulation and mathematical statement of hypothesis, econometrics then applies the tools of statistics to test their validity. It is pointed out that statistical techniques may be used earlier to aid in the formulation of the theories. The portion of the book that elaborates on the use of statistics in econometrics adds very little. It summarizes the usual introductory statistical techniques and shows how these may be applied to economic data. Most of this could have been omitted and reference made to known statistical works.

The book is recommended for reading by all graduate students and teachers of economics who have not worked in the field of econometrics. Its value lies not in any profound contribution to economics, but in its useful statement of the role and methods of economics, mathematics, and statistics as combined into the discipline of econometrics. Although the preface states that "The powerful tools of mathematics make possible first of all the formulation of economic hypothesis without the confining boundaries of rigid *ceteris paribus* assumptions; and the equally powerful tools of statistics enable us then to confront these hypothesis meaningfully with the facts," this reviewer is not convinced that either is true, except in limited degree. Throughout the book (although one or two additional variables are treated) the mathematical statements are based upon rigorous assumptions. Likewise, the author makes an unconvincing effort to show the reader that the data which he needs to test economic theories are measurable. Perhaps the principal value of the book is to show what econometrics cannot do.

Louisiana State University

W. H. Baughn

FREDERIC MEYERS: *Economics of Labor Relations*. (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1951, Pp., 435, \$5.00.)

Professor Lester has stated: "Only those who have tried (to produce a first-class textbook) know how difficult and arduous such an achievement is." Your reviewer, who is under contract for the preparation of a labor problems textbook, appreciates fully the difficulty in writing a text which will satisfy the professional critics and still remain a stimulating, challenging, and understandable book for undergraduate students.

The first hundred pages of Professor Meyers' book are dull—in organization, content, and presentation. Chapter IV, for example, with its quotes from and for scholars—"Dr. John Blair . . . said," "as Berle and Means have indicated," "as another author (Chamberlain) put it"—reminds me of some seminar reports which make graduate student and professor drowsy. Meyers does not use colorful and dynamic illustrative materials, of which there is an abundance in labor relations. The book

has few tables (poorly explained), fewer graphs; it has no pictures, cartoons, or good visual aids.

The strength of Dr. Meyers' book is in his analysis of the labor market, beginning in Chapter XII. After evaluating the neoclassical and bargaining theories, Meyers says: "... that the effort to evolve a general theory of wages in isolation is fruitless; that many economists know this to be so; but that, in deference to the habit of advancing a theory of wages, they still feel under obligation to do so." He adds, "... that employment relationships are not like mechanical phenomena. However complex, they need to be looked upon with as all-inclusive a view as perception permits, and the results of the relationships need to be analyzed as a totality of which wages is only one part, impossible to isolate them from the totality for analytical purposes." On this base, the last chapters are solidly built.

Economics of Labor Relations has relatively few errors of commission, but many of omission. On Page 126 the author refers to "existing (labor) law" as the National Labor Relations Act instead of the Labor-Management Relations Act. Only in a few sentences was mention made of the valuable contributions of the War Labor Board in the settlement of disputes. The reviewer can find no discussion of cost-of-living or escalator clauses, no explanation of portal-to-portal pay, and no index reference to jurisdictional disputes.

Professor Meyers' textbook could be used best in an advanced class in labor economics; it does not meet the requirements for an introductory labor problems course.

Western Reserve University

Dallas M. Young

KENNETH FELS, et al.: *Intelligence and Cultural Differences: A Study of Cultural Learning and Problem-solving*. (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1951, Pp., 388, \$5.00).

This book makes two notable contributions to the field of research known as mental testing: (1) It gives a systematic evaluation of the more prominent intelligence tests that are being administered today; and (2) it is an original research contribution to one significant phase of intelligence tests.

Part I of this volume presents a review of previous research and an evaluation of commonly used intelligence tests. Research shows that there are significant differences in intelligent-test performance of children and youth from different socioeconomic backgrounds, with children from the higher levels always securing the higher intelligence-test scores. In evaluating the intelligence tests of Binet, Otis, Henmon and Nelson, Terman, and Terman-McNemar, 4 criticisms are made: (1) The problems of these tests are drawn very largely from the cultural experience of the urban middle-class cultural group. (2) The tests do not equally

motivate children of all socioeconomic groups. (3) The test items are too heavily weighted with verbal facility, or so-called "verbal intelligence" problems, and do not include a wide range of mental problems. (4) The tests are designed only to predict success in school achievement—not to measure a subject's general mental potential for problem-solving. *"So long, however, as 'Intelligence Tests' are designed only to predict achievement in terms of present curriculums of the schools, so long will their items be too limited in mental range, in cultural content and in intrinsic motivation, to be capable of measuring the general problem-solving activities of human beings."*

The research reported here is an analysis of the responses of white pupils from high and low social-status backgrounds to more than 650 items in eight widely used group intelligence tests. Its primary purpose was to identify (a) those kinds of test problems on which children from high socioeconomic background show the greatest superiority, and (b) those kinds of test problems on which children from low socioeconomic backgrounds do relatively well.

Intelligence tests were administered to 2,295, 9 and 10 year old pupils and to 2,510, 13 and 14 year old pupils in 37 public and private schools in the metropolitan area of Rockford, Illinois in January and March, 1946. Four tests were given to the 9 and 10 year old pupils: (1) Otis Alpha Nonverbal (I. Q.); (2) Otis Alpha Verbal (I. Q.); (3) Henmon-Nelson (I. Q.); and (4) Kuhlmann-Anderson (I. Q.). Five tests were administered to the 13 and 14 year-old group: (1) Terman-McNemar (I. Q.); (2) Otis Beta (I. Q.); (3) California Mental Maturity (percentile rank); (4) Thurstone Spatial (percentile rank); and (5) Thurstone Reasoning (percentile rank).

An index of Status Characteristics, (modified from Lloyd W. Warner, et al.), was used to measure socioeconomic status of the families from which the children in the study came. This index was based upon equally weighted ratings, on a seven-point scale, of four factors: the parents' occupation, parents' education, type of house, and dwelling area in the community. This index and the method of validation have been criticized.

Dr. Fells states that at least five possible kinds of factors may contribute to status differences in Intelligence-test performance: (1) genetic ability, (2) developmental (mental growth) factors, (3) cultural bias in test items, (4) test motivation, and (5) test-work habits or test skills. The first two factors are presumed to determine the actual intelligence of the child as it might be evidenced in thinking clearly and in solving appropriate problems in real-life situations, while the last three factors are oriented toward the test situation as such and are assumed to affect the pupil's ability to score well on the test. There is no conclusive proof

in the data presented that any one or any combination of factors is chiefly responsible for status differences.

Dr. Fells proposes that the meaning of intelligence-test results would be clarified by making more clear-cut distinctions between three types of intelligence which may be termed: (1) *genetic intelligence*—by which is meant those biological and physiological structures (neural systems, etc.) which may be determined at conception by the genetic structure of the individual. (2) *developmental intelligence*—which means the mental abilities or capacities of a child at any given time after birth, when environment has had opportunity to have some impact on the development of the child. (3) *Test intelligence*—by which is meant that which is measured by any given intelligence test. Scores on intelligence tests are sometimes interpreted as estimates of either genetic or developmental intelligence, although the test scores always include some extraneous factors such as test motivation, cultural bias in the items, and test skills. While only the third of these can be measured directly, the chief theoretical importance is attached to the first two. The test-makers, however, dodge the significant theoretical questions by hiding behind the cloak of "operationalism".

Those readers who are interested in the theoretical issues concerning what items go into a test will find this book to be significant reading. This volume is the first book-length report of an extended study of cultural learning as it bears upon the solution of problems in mental tests to be published. Five other major projects will be published in the near future. Any reader who is interested in intelligence tests will want to read the other five publications when they become available.

Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College

James D. Tarver

FRED S. SPIER: *The Golden Gate*. (New York, Terrace Publishers, 1950, Pp., 264, \$3.00.)

Definitely a book on metaphysical problems. The author acknowledges the close relationship between his thesis (that the *Will to Perfection* is the ultimate reality) and the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer. Spier believes there is such a thing as the will of the universe and that it is striving toward perfection. He believes the universe, beginning in a more or less chaotic state, is continually evolving toward the state of perfection, and that the "Will" of the universe is responsible for both the impetus and the goal toward which it is moving. Evolution, will, and perfection are keywords in his system. I judge the author is a pan-psychist.

Spier claims to present a prolegomena to a new system of philosophy and maintains that "no present or future philosophy will have any sense or meaning without cosmic evolution as its cornerstone and foundation."

Present day science, Spier claims, gives us only cross-sections through reality, but only in moments of inspiration may we behold that ultimate reality is nothing but eternal becoming. Spier claims to be neither materialist nor idealist, but a "middle of the roader." Had Bergson substituted "volunte creative" for "elan vital," his spiritualistic prejudice would have been overcome. Had Spinoza known of evolution, so Spier contends, he might have found the right interpretation for this voice in his mind, namely the will to perfection. "... even the common man, if he listens to the voice of erfection, . . . will find intuitively a reliable guide in himself to tell him, at least with aproximate certainty, what is good or evil, what is good or bad." He who hears the voice of the will to perfection needs no other norm to show him the proper attitude toward his fellow men. Through an understanding of the will to perfection, so the author contends, a higher type of man will emerge, and in him there will be a new kind of harmonious instinct which will guide him in all moral situations.

As the reader can observe, this book is definitely anti-positivistic and non-scientific if not anti-scientific. It will appeal to the mystic and possibly to religious minded persons not satisfied with traditional religion. To the sophisticated layman, this book will leave the impression that he has learned something about the mysteries of the universe. Some light is thrown on the basic philosophy of Spinoza and Schopenhauer. Philosophers of science will disagree with practically everything in the book, and positivists will call it "metaphysics," which, for them, is a bad word.

The University of Texas David L. Miller

REX A. SKIDMORE, and ANTHON S. CANNON: *Building Your Marriage*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951, Pp., 650, \$5.00.)

This book is designed for a text in college courses treating of marriage and family relationships. Though the title includes only the word marriage, the text, especially in Part III, includes materials on parent-child relationships. The content is about the same as that of other recent books, though it is organized and presented in a less formal manner than in many of the others. About forty pages are composed of direct quotations from other sources. Additional data are obtained from a study made by the authors of 740 students in the University of Utah.

The selection of content was made chiefly from what the students desired to know about marriage. This method of selection tends to limit the content to subjects in which the college students are interested and to omit the subjects which they need to know and about which they have had no experience to arouse interest. It also tends to omit the topics for which they have already obtained conclusions and attitudes from their experiences in life. These conclusions and attitudes are fre-

quently accepted without question even though they are inaccurate and often tend to cause conflicts and failures in marriage. One of the purposes of college courses in this field is the correction of these conclusions.

Fortunately the authors did not entirely neglect this latter purpose. The large amount of material which they use from biology, psychology, and research studies in marriage serve to replace faulty though popular ideas and attitudes. The book, however, does not include a second method which some texts and teachers use to clear away the prevailing misinformation and conclusions. This method is a short study of the historical background of marriage and family life to discover the values and functions of marriage and their adjustments to the various stages of man's development.

Finally, the authors use a number of records of cases from their files to illustrate the various problems and situations. This procedure has the value of arousing interest but the cases are so incompletely analyzed that they seem to have little value in teaching. A good index, questions for discussion, topics for further study and report, and a fairly complete bibliography add to the value of the book.

Northwestern State College of Louisiana

Alvin Good

G. A. LINCOLN, W. S. STONE, and T. H. HARVEY, (Editors: *Economics of National Security*. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950, Pp., 601, \$5.00.)

The *Economics of National Security* is a summation of current social science thought on such topics as "Manpower," "War Finance," "Raw Materials," etc. Its significance as a highway marker of the times derives from this fact.

Under the pressures put on them in world cultures social scientists seem to be giving up critical cultural analysis and accepting the role of servants who must accept what governments are up to as tabu to analysis. Not in toto, but this book signifies one sample of a trend. It is based uncritically on such slogans as "Peace Through Power," which, among other things, blandly assumes that there is such a thing as the *Economics of national security*.

The accumulated fund of knowledge available to social scientists throw doubt on such propositions. Rather, "Peace through power" leads to armament races and armament races lead to war. Nor can any of our nations individually muster the resources necessary to insure *national security*.

Nevertheless social scientists tell us in this book that America can have "Peace through Power," that the U. S. can have national security. Our bomb, our science, the argument runs, is our technological Maginot Line. In such a case all ought to be happy. Any other nation with science

and the bomb should, according to this thesis, also have peace and national security. Russia has the bomb and science and that should cinch the case for security and peace, in two nations at least.

Trouble is, it doesn't work out that way. Probably because of what Karl Polanyi calls the "Great Transformation" that is taking place. In this transformation Indians, minus armament, have run the British out of India, being wearied of Western domination. Britain, which tried the peace through power strategy in the 19th Century, seems not to have done well, as a long run proposition. And Britain had a tighter hold of industrial technology than the U. S. now has. We share the industrial revolution with many peoples.

To social scientists operating as scientists, there is no "economics of national security," no "peace through power," no "mobilization for survival." The "great transformation," which we should be studying, is the reality.

Those who read this publication, Russians included, might read, as an antidote, Mennen's *Prevalence of Witches*. These ideas are among the worst witches harrying the peoples of the earth.

North Texas State College

R. B. Melton

STUART CHASE: *Roads to Agreement*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951, Pp., 250, \$2.75.)

Social conflict which is *sine qua non* and inevitable in the interactional processes between peoples is a phenomenon that has captured the attention of social scientists for several hundred years. Despite their efforts, however, not too much progress has been made in the understanding of this complex process; and accordingly, social scientists have not been very successful in locating the principles that make for accommodation and cooperation (agreement) among men.

Roads to Agreement, a sequel to *The Proper Study of Mankind*, is a substantial contribution to the problem of achieving a society where men live together as individuals, families, groups, and nations, in peace. As such, the volume makes a major contribution to the theoretical aspects of social conflict, although explicitly, this was not Dr. Stuart Chase's chief aim in writing the book. Rather, in studying social conflict and agreement, the author was guided by four major problems: 1. *The Areas of Conflict*: the kinds of quarrels in which human beings engage; 2. *The Roots of Conflict*: the basis of quarrelsomeness in human beings; 3. *Natural Offsets to Conflict*: the limits to man's quarrelsomeness; and 4. *Techniques to Lessen Conflict and Promote Agreement*: the science of human relations—group dynamics, semantics, and culture.

Dr. Chase's central frame of reference is in the area of integration of scientific knowledge. He attempts to integrate techniques of agreement from widely distant sources. He calls for fewer specialists who "know

more and more about less and less" to be replaced by "a liaison service . . . 'The Integrator,' like a walkie-talkie . . . a communication man."

Most of the author's attention is devoted to the technique and "know-how" of resolving conflict and promoting agreement among peoples. In this connection, he is particularly impressed and discusses in some detail the work in group dynamics based on pioneer experiments of Kurt Lewin with autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire groups. He gives outstanding examples of the application of the "field" theory approach of the Quaker meeting and the Acheson-Lilienthal team, the worker-participation in industry with successful labor relations, business conferences, town meetings, etc.

The scientific findings of the university centered experiments in human relations clinics, laboratories and institutes at M. I. T., Chicago, Harvard, Michigan, and Princeton, along with those of non-academic centers of research are reported, analyzed, and evaluated. The author painstakingly shows how these findings can be integrated and applied to problems on the local, national, and international levels of human understanding and agreement.

Roads to Agreement is another one of Stuart Chase's important social science books. Like the others that I have had the pleasure to read, it is a practical discussion of an important human relations problem written in simple, straight-forward and understandable language; it should be profitable reading for teachers, writers, public speakers, lawyers, parents, diplomats, congressmen, labor leaders, as well as social scientists.

Atlanta University

Mozell C. Hill

ALEXANDER KOKKALIS: *Introduction to the Total Theory of Labor*. (Concord, New Hampshire: Evans Printing Company, 1951, Pp., 232, \$6.00.)

Introduction to the Total Theory of Labor is presented as a fundamental theoretical study designed to reorient the perspectives of economists. The author, formerly Associate Professor at the University of Athens, offers "a new way of research by means of which we will have, not only a sound and positive foundation of economics, but a unified and comprehensive explanation of all phenomena which appear within the realm of man's activities".

The key to this universal social science is the concept of "labor energy" which is expressed in economic activity through the forms of "directional energy" and "executory energy". The book is a reinterpretation of the theory of capital, value, and income in terms of "labor energy".

Kokkalis arrives at his concept of "labor energy" by assuming it in the first chapter as the "stuff" or "essence" of which the universe, the economy included, is composed. The reader is informed that "the entire universe is constituted of infinite energy . . . (and) man, like every

other being, receives a small portion, a small energy, from this infinite energy of the universe".

Capital is one of the manifestations of the fundamental substance—"labor energy". "Capital is the executory labor energy crystallized in the external world as a result of new, more productive directions of production."

The author stresses the distinction between "directive" and "executory" energy. "He considers as the directional factor the intellectual power which determines what must be produced and how. As an executory factor he regards in the first place the corporeal power which executes what is determined by the intellectual." Increases in capital are the "result of the elevation of the productivity of the directive factor" and therefore "the size of wages and profits depend on the productivity of the factor of direction".

The author's meaning is obscured by his ponderous and metaphorical style. Translated into simple prose, his capital theory is basically a theory of economic organization. He treats the growth of capital, and thereby the income of labor, as a consequence of the organizing ability of the entrepreneur—the "directive factor". Like Schumpeter in *The Theory of Economic Development*, he accounts for increases in productivity and income primarily in terms of the business man rather than stressing the activities of the scientist or the economic planner. He gives little attention to the areas revealed in the TNEC studies or Burns' *Decline of Competition* where the organizing abilities of the entrepreneur function as brakes retarding technological change and productive improvements.

Kokkalis' concept of method in economics is in the tradition of the medieval Schoolmen rather than the modern empirical social scientist. It is "strictly one of conceptual analysis. Thus we arrive at conceptual analytic statements which possess a priori validity. Assuming that science is concerned exclusively with the analysis, the definition and the comparison of concepts, we attempt through an analysis of basic concepts to arrive at positive and stable conclusions."

Kokkalis arrives at his "positive and stable conclusions" because he assumed them in the first place. If the fundamental essence of all economic activity is "labor energy", then it follows by definition that capital, value, material goods, the "directional" and "executory" elements, etc. are, one and all, embodiments of "labor energy". Statements that this is the case are not descriptions pointing to the real world about us. They are simply the necessary implications of the author's original axioms and only in this sense do they possess any validity—a priori or otherwise.

This type of procedure does not allow for empirical testing and the revision of hypotheses in the light of evidence. It imprisons the author on his level of tautology. It bars Kokkalis from moving on to problems

of economic policy by setting out the conditions through which actual real-world societies might effectively utilize "labor energy".

The author has published widely in Greek and German. His current work represents an effort to obtain a hearing before a wider audience. But *The Total Theory of Labor* adds little that will appeal to the empirical researcher or the student of policy.

The University of Texas

Leonard A. Lecht

Other Books Received

- Barnes, Harry Elmer: *Society in Transition*. (2nd Ed.) (New York: Prentice-Hall Co., 1952, Pp., 878, \$6.00.)
- Carter, R. W.: *The American Government and its Work*. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952, Pp., 875, \$6.00.)
- Commonwealth of Kentucky: *Kentucky Youth Problems*. (Frankfort, Kentucky: Legislative Research Commission, 1951, Pp., 69, NP.)
- Commonwealth of Kentucky: *Debt Administration*. (Frankfort, Kentucky: Legislative Research Commission, 1952, Pp., 27, NP.)
- Commonwealth of Kentucky: *Local Fiscal Relations*. (Frankfort, Kentucky: Legislative Research Commission, 1952, Pp., 63, NP.)
- Flumiani, C. M.: *Basic Precepts on the Psychology and Pathology of Leadership*. (Santa Clara, California: Institute for Political and Economic Studies, 1952, Pp., 38, \$1.00.)
- Herz, John H.: *Political Realism and Political Idealism*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, Pp., 275, \$3.75.)
- Institute of Public Affairs: *A Layman's Guide to the Texas State Administrative Agencies*. (1951 Supplement). (Austin, Texas: Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1951, Pp., 90, \$0.75.)
- Morris, Norval: *The Habitual Criminal*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, Pp., 395, \$5.00.)
- Newman, P. C.: *Development of Economic Thought*. (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1952, Pp., 456, \$5.00.)
- Perkins, Dexter and Conant, James: *The Story of U. S. Foreign Policy*. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1952, Pp., 62, \$0.35.)
- Record, Wilson: *The Negro and the Communist Party*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951, Pp., 340, \$3.50.)
- Scott, John A.: *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France, 1870-1914*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, Pp., 209, \$3.00.)
- Shotwell, James T. (Ed.): *Governments of Continental Europe*. (Revised Edition). (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952, Pp., 881, \$6.00.)
- Strauss, Eric: *Irish Nationalism and British Democracy*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, Pp., 307, \$4.25.)

The Association

Annual Convention. The Southwestern Social Science Association will hold its annual convention for 1952 at Dallas, Texas, on Friday and Saturday, April 11 and 12. General headquarters for the convention will be at the Baker Hotel, Commerce and Akard. Copies of the preliminary program have been distributed by mail to Association members, and copies of the final printed program will be available at convention headquarters. The program was prepared under the supervision of Ralph L. Edgel, University of New Mexico, general program chairman. Attention of members is directed to the list of Dallas hotels, with room rates, on page six of the preliminary program.

General Dinner Meeting. President Vernon G. Sorrell, University of New Mexico, will deliver the annual presidential address at the conference dinner meeting, Friday evening, 7 p. m., in the Crystal Ballroom. His topic will be "Unity, or the Lack of It, in the Social Sciences." At the same meeting, Professor John Ise, University of Kansas, will speak on "The Sales Problem in Education." Presiding at the session will be the first vice-president of the Association, Professor H. R. Mundhenke, Texas Christian University.

Section Luncheon Meetings. Arrangements for section luncheon meetings have been made by several sections, including Accounting, Geography, Social Science Introductory Course, and the American Business Writing Association. These will all be held at 12:30 p. m. on Friday, April 11. Tickets should be secured from section chairmen in advance. Other section luncheons than those announced may be scheduled, so members should consult their section chairmen at the convention.

American Business Writing Association. The Southwest Section of this organization is holding its annual meeting to coincide with that of the Association, so that members of each group may take advantage of the discussions and conferences of the other. General headquarters, registration and meetings will be in the Adolphus Hotel. Mrs. Lillian L. Warren, Southwest Regional Chairman, is in charge.

Student Section, Southwestern Sociological Society. The Southwestern Sociological Society, which constitutes the sociology section of the Association, sponsors each year a program for students in sociology to coincide with the annual meeting. Headquarters and meetings will be in the Baker, with registration at 8 a. m., on Friday, April 11.

Registration and Dues. The Secretary-Treasurer's desk will be located on the Mezzanine floor in the Lounge, Baker Hotel. Members and visitors are requested to register immediately upon arrival. Regis-

tration will be open from 8:00 to 10:00 p. m. on Thursday, April 10, from 7:45 a. m. to 5:00 p. m. on Friday, and from 8:00 a. m. to 12:00 noon on Saturday. Members who have not already remitted dues by mail are urged to pay them to the Secretary-Treasurer at the conference, by check if possible. Section registration will be taken at the doors of the respective conference rooms.

Resolutions. Persons and sections having resolutions to bring before the Association should file them in writing with the Chairman of the Resolutions Committee by 6:00 p. m. on Friday.

Executive Council Meetings. The Executive Council will meet Thursday, April 10, 7:30 p. m. in Room 4 on the Mezzanine floor. The newly elected Council will meet Saturday morning immediately following the general business meeting (place to be announced).

Business Meetings and Elections. The general business meeting of the Association is scheduled at 8:00 a. m. on Saturday morning. Full attendance is essential to the continued success of the Association. Section business meetings will be held on Friday afternoon immediately following the presentation of papers and discussions. The members of each section elect a chairman and an associate editor. The current section chairmen are to report the names of the newly elected section officers to the Secretary-Treasurer by 6:00 p. m. Friday.

Exhibits. A number of the book companies have arranged interesting and informative exhibits which will be on display in the Mezzanine Lounge throughout the meetings. These companies are making a two-fold contribution to the success of the Association's annual convention. Members will find the exhibits helpful to their planning of classwork, and the company representatives are anxious to be of maximum help to all of us. In addition the companies have been generous in their financial contributions to the Association. The Executive Council suggests that the membership take full advantage of the exhibits to examine offerings of the publishers and to discuss problems of texts and collateral readings with the publishers' representatives. A list of the exhibiting companies appears on the last page of the program.

Committees. President Vernon G. Sorrell has announced the appointment of the following committees of the Association, which have been active in the preparation of plans for the Convention and in other Association affairs:

NOMINATION OF OFFICERS: Rupert N. Richardson, Chairman, Hardin-Simmons University; Francis Ballard, Southern Methodist University; Robert C. Cotner, University of Texas; Jack Johnson, North Texas State College; Karl Reyer, Louisiana State University; Othel A. Westfal, Oklahoma University; Henry Moore, University of Alabama.

MEMBERSHIP: P. F. Boyer, Chairman, Louisiana State University. *Accounting:* John E. Kane, University of Arkansas; D. M. Smith, Jr., University of New Mexico; W. P. Carr, Loyola University; Allan T. Steele, University of Tulsa; Tom Rose, North Texas State College. *Agricultural Economics:* Hilliard Jackson, University of Arkansas; Peter Nelson, Oklahoma A. and M. College; B. M. Gile, Louisiana State University; Joe R. Motheral, Texas A. and M. College. *Business Administration:* Paul W. Milam, University of Arkansas; Lionel D. Haight, New Mexico A. and M. College; Glenn L. Hodge, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; Francis R. Cella, University of Oklahoma; John P. Owen, University of Houston. *Economics:* Earl C. Thibodeaux, University of Arkansas; John R. Hodges, University of Kansas City; Jim E. Reese, University of Oklahoma; Paul Hendershot, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; Julian Duncan, University of New Mexico; H. H. Hamner, Baylor University. *Geography:* Elmer S. Jack, Arkansas State College; John W. Morris, University of Oklahoma; John S. Kyser, Northwestern State College; Stanley A. Arbingast, University of Texas. *Government:* Fred M. Croom, Arkansas Polytechnic College; Ira G. Clark, New Mexico A. and M. College; Lorimer E. Storey, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; John Paul Duncan, University of Oklahoma; Roscoe C. Adkins, North Texas State College. *History:* Homer C. Huitt, Arkansas State College; Frank D. Reeve, University of New Mexico; G. W. McGinty, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute- Ralph Records, University of Oklahoma; J. D. Bragg, Baylor University. *Sociology:* J. L. Charlton, University of Arkansas; R. H. Bolyard, Southwestern Louisiana Institute; John C. Belcher, Oklahoma A. and M. College; J. F. Foster, University of Denver; Paul Walter, Jr., University of New Mexico; Robert L. Skrabanek, Texas A. and M. College.

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS: Harvey H. Guice, Chairman, Southern Methodist University; C. F. Lay, Southern Methodist University; John P. McKinsey, Southern Methodist University.

INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERSHIP: Ralph C. Russell, Chairman, Texas College of Arts and Industries; Rupert N. Richardson, Hardin-Simmons University; Joseph C. Pray, University of Oklahoma; David C. Boyd, University of Houston; Austin L. Porterfield, Texas Christian University; Reginald Rushing, Texas Technological College.

ENDOWMENT: W. M. Pritchett, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank, Dallas; S. B. Kovacs, University of Tulsa; Cortez A. M. Ewing, Oklahoma University; Earl L. Saliers, Louisiana State University; John R. Stockton, Texas University; Lionel D. Haight, New Mexico A. and M. College; H. A. Dulan, University of Arkansas.

RESOLUTIONS: G. L. Guthrie, Chairman, New Mexico A. and M. College; Emmette E. Redford, University of Texas; H. L. McCracken, Louisiana State University; Ralph C. Hook, Texas A. and M. College.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: O. D. Duncan, Chairman, Oklahoma A. and M. College; Sigurd Johansen, New Mexico A. and M. College; John W. White, University of Texas; J. B. Trant, Louisiana State University; W. E. Gettys, University of Texas.

AUDIT: L. F. Morrison, Chairman, Louisiana State University; John Dunbar, University of New Mexico; John R. White, University of Texas; Leo Herbert, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; Harvel Smolinski, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute.

News Notes

The University of Wichita held its first annual Conference on Public Affairs in November 1951, with the meetings devoted to the general subject of metropolitan problems. The program included discussions on schools, cultural activity, utilities, traffic and transportation, surrounding areas, parks and recreation, health, family and child welfare and mental health, housing, metropolitan planning, community health and welfare, and finance. Consultants for the three day session included: Dr. Emery Olson, Dean of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California; Dr. Morris B. Lambie, Professor of Government, Harvard; Dr. Edwin A. Cottrell, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stanford; Dr. Edwin O. Stene, Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas; Mr. L. P. Cookingham, City Manager, Kansas City, Missouri; Jack F. McKay, Consultant, Texas Economy Commission; Dr. Hilden Gibson, Professor of Political Science and Sociology, University of Kansas; President Harry F. Corbin, University of Wichita; and Dr. Hugo Wall, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Wichita.

The departments of the Social Science Division of the University of Arkansas have been engaged in a series of conferences concerned with planning a program in Social Sciences to be offered as part of the General Education (basic two-year) program of the College of Arts and Sciences. It is contemplated that the General Education Program will be initiated in the fall term of 1952.

Dr. Albert Lunday, Professor of Sociology at Hardin-Simmons University, Abilene, is on leave as a chaplain with the Air Force, with the rank of major. His tour of duty is for seventeen months beginning in February. He is replaced by Dr. Ottar Tinglum, a native of Norway, who came to the United States in 1927, becoming a citizen in 1932. Dr. Tinglum was educational director of State Wide Cooperatives in Minnesota and Wisconsin before accepting his present position.

Classes in sociology at Hardin-Simmons University have been cooperating with the Abilene City Commissioners in making a traffic survey; and with the local real-estate board in a housing survey for use of the Air Force and the Federal Housing Administration.

Dr. Richard B. Johnson, Chairman, Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, is conducting two research projects under Carnegie grants: one on economic aberrations in metropolitan areas of the Southwest, and the second on the literature of southwestern economic development. Dr. Johnson is also serving as a member of the statistical committee of the Texas Educational Agency and of the Council of

Texas Economic Education, promoting workshops in economic education. Professor Walter E. Boles, Jr., of the same department, has been a public member of Region X, Wages Stabilization Board, since its organization in September 1951.

Dr. Allan W. Eister, Associate Professor of Sociology, Southern Methodist University, contributed a paper on "Some Social Factors Implicated in Various Behavioral Outcomes" at the meeting of the Texas Psychological Association held in Dallas, December 1951.

John H. Southern has been appointed Technical Assistance Officer for the Land and Water Use Branch of the Food and Agriculture Organization. He left the United States in July, 1951, to take up his duties in Rome, Italy, at the headquarters of the Organization. In his new job he will help to brief experts in land and water use who are going for FAO to its various member countries to give assistance and advice under the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program. He will also work with the governments concerned in negotiating agreements under this program, help to select experts for field assignments, choose fellowship candidates, and maintain project records. Mr. Southern is an agricultural economist specializing in land utilization and tenure problems. He is on leave of absence from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. Since April 1946 he has been with the BAE at College Station, Texas, where he is also an associate member of the Graduate Faculty at Texas A&M College.

Martin D. Woodin, professor and economist in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Louisiana State University, will be on leave from March 10 to September 5 to study the sugar industry in Formosa for the Mutual Security Agency in Washington, D. C.

L. S. Paine, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, Texas A & M College, has resigned to accept a position on the staff of the Texas Engineering Experiment Station.

A staff seminar on research methodology has been initiated at Texas A & M College under the chairmanship of Joe R. Motheral. In addition to personnel of the School of Agriculture, participants will include Joseph Ackerman of the Farm Foundation, Kenneth H. Parson of the University of Wisconsin, and Harry Trelogan of the Agricultural Research Administration.

A study of farm labor utilization in the Texas High Plains has been instituted under the joint sponsorship of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology of Texas A & M College and the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Project leaders include Joe R. Motheral for A & M College and William H. Metzler for the Bureau of Agricultural

Economics. The analysis will be based on the experience of a sample of 300 farm operators in Lubbock and Crosby counties during the 1951 cotton season. It will be aimed at providing information for planning the labor program for the 1952 season.

Dr. Herbert R. Mundhenke, Chairman, Department of Economics, Texas Christian University, has been appointed Governor of the Texas Province of Pi Gamma Mu, National Social Science Honor Society.

Dr. Homer L. Hitt, of the Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University, is serving as secretary of the Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology Section of the Association of Southern Agricultural Workers, charged with the program for the forty-ninth annual convention of the group, held in Atlanta in February. Dr. Hitt also contributed a paper on "America's Aged at Mid-Century" at the second annual Southern Conference of Gerontology, held at the University of Florida in January. Dr. Hitt and Dr. T. Lynn Smith, of the University of Florida, have recently completed a long research program on Louisiana population, culminating in a comprehensive treatise, *The People of Louisiana*, which is scheduled for early publication by the Louisiana State University Press.

Dr. Rudolf Heberle, Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University, is serving this year as president of the Southern Sociological Society. Dr. Heberle recently completed a pioneering study of political sociology entitled *Social Movements*, and a monograph on displaced persons in Louisiana and Mississippi, the latter in collaboration with Mr. Dudley S. Hall, under the auspices of the Displaced Persons Commission of Louisiana and the L. S. U. Institute of Population Research.

Dr. Marion B. Smith, of the same department, is serving as president of the Southwest Council on Family Relations; vice-president and program chairman of the Southwestern Sociological Society; and chairman of the section on teaching of sociology of the Southern Sociological Society. He is currently directing a survey of the programs of southern colleges and universities for the teaching of marriage and family relations. Dr. Alvin L. Bertrand, of the same department, recently led a discussion of the effects of agricultural mechanization on tenure arrangements at the Southwestern Land Tenure Committee meeting at Texarkana. Dr. Bertrand is serving this year as chairman of the social science section of the Louisiana Academy of Sciences.

